Adorno-resignation 361c1l

9 RESIGNATION We older represemauves o f that for which the name Frankfur t School has established itself have recently had the reproach of resignation levelled against us. We had , it is stated , developed elements of a critical th eor y of society. but we wer e not prepared to draw the practical conseq ue nces from this theo ry. We neither design ed programmes for action nor did we suppo rt the action s of those wh o felt themselves inspired by critical theory. I shall Sidestep the question whether this demand can be mad e OI l all upon th eoreti cal think ers who always

remain to a certain degree sensitive and by no means unshakable instruments. The task assigned suc h indi viduals within a soc iety c haracterized by the divisio n ofl abo ur might indeed be qu estionable; they themselves might well be defo rm ed by it. But they have also been formed by it. And there is 110 way in whi ch they can rep eal that wh ich th ey have become merely through an act of their own will. I sho uld not want to deny the impulse of subjective weakness inh erent in the con finement to theo ry. The ob jection raised against us can be stated approximately in th ese wo rds; a perso n wh o in the present hour doubts th e possibilit y of radical c hange in society and wh o for that reason neither takes par t in no r recommends spectacular. violent action is guilt y of resignation. He does not conside r th e vision of change wh ich he o nce held capable of realization : indeed. he actua lly had no tru e

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desire to see it realized in the first place. In leaving conditions as they are, he offers his tacit approval of th em. Distance from praxis is disrep utable in the eyes of everyone. Anyone who doe s not take immediate actio n and who is not willing to get his hands dirty is the subject of suspicion; it is felt that his antipathy toward such action was nOI legitimate, and furth er that his view has even been disto rted by the privilege s he enjoys. Distrust o f those who distru st praxis extends from those o n the opposite side, who rep eat the old slogan , 'We've had eno ugh of talking ' all the way to the objective spirit of advertisi ng, which propagates the picture it's called Leirblld or 'image as moti f ' - of the actively involved human being, no matter whet her his activity lies in the realm of econ omi cs or athleti cs. One sho uld take part . whoever restricts himself to thinking bur doe s not get involved is weak, cowardly and virtuall y a traitor, This hostile cliche on the intellectual is to be encountered with deep roots wit hin that branch of the opposnton that is in turn reviled as intellectu al without any awareness thereof on their part. Thin king activists answer; among the things to be changed is that very separation of theory and praxis. Praxis is essential if we are ever to be libera ted from the domination o f practical peopl e and practical ideals. The trou ble with this view is that it results in the pro hib ition of thi nking. Very little is needed to turn the resistance against repression repressively against those who - little as they might wish to glorify their state of being - do not desert the standpoint that they have com e to occupy. The often -evoked unity of theory and praxis has a tendency to give way to the pred ominance of praxis. Numero us views define theory itself as a form o f repre ssion - as though praxis did not stand in a far more di rect relatio nsh ip to repr ession, For Marx, the dogma of this unity was anim ated by the immanent possibility of action which even then was no t 10 be realized. Today it is rather the opposite situation that prevails. One clings to action because of the imposstbtlnv of action . But Marx himself reve als a concealed wound in this regard. He no doubt delivered the eleventh thesis on Feue rbach in suc h an author itarian fashion because he was not at all sure of it him self. In his youth he had demanded the 'ruthless criticism of everything that exists' . Now he mocked criticism. But his famou s joke about the Young Hegelians, his coinage 'critical criticism' , was a dud and went up in sm oke as nothing but a tautol ogy . The for ced

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precedence o f praxis brought the criticism which Marx himself practised to an irrational hall. In Russia and in the o rthodoxy of othe r countries. the malicio us mocker y of critical criticism became the instrument that permitted the status quo to establish itself in such horrifying fashion , The only meaning that praxis retained was this: increased production of the means of production . The only criticism still tolerated was that people still were not wor king hard enough. This demon strates how easily the subo rdination o f theory to praxis results in the suppo rt of renewed repr ession. Repressive intolerance toward a thought not immediately accom panied by instru ction s for action is founded in fear. Unmantpulared th ought and the position that allows nothing to be deduced from this though t must be feared because that w hich cann ot be itted is perfectly clear: this thought is right. An aged bo ur geois mechani sm with which the men of the Enligh tenment of the eigh teent h cent ury were very familiar displays itself anew bur unchanged: s uffering caused by a negative co ndition - in this case by obstructed reality - turn s into anger towa rd the person wh o expr esses it. Thought. enlig htenment cons cious o f uself thr eatens to disenchant pseudo-reality within whi ch. accordi ng to Haberma s' form ulation . activism moves. This activism is tolerated only because it is viewed as pseudo-activity . Pseudo -activity is allied with pseudo-reality in the deSign of a sub jective position : an activit y that overplays itself and fires itself up for the sake of its own publi city with out itting to wha t degree it serves as a substitute for satisfaction . thus elevating itself to ail end in itself All tho se behind bars are despondent in their desire to be released. In suc h situations on e no longer thi nks o r thin ks onl y in fictive postulates. Within abscluuzed praxis. unly reaction is possible and for this reason the reaction is false. Only thinking co uld offer an escape. and then only that thinking, the results of whi ch are not prescribed - as is so frequ en tly the case in those discussion s in whi ch it is predetermined who is right and wh ich therefore do not advance the cause - but rather degenerate wit hout fail into tactics. Whe n the doors are barricaded . it is doubly important that thought nor be iruerrupted.It is rather the task of thought to analyse the reason s behind this situation and to draw the conseque nces from these reasons . It is the respon sibility of though t not 10 accept th e situ ation as finite. jf there is any chance of changing the

RESIGNATION 201 situ atio n, it is only through undiminished insight. The leap into praxis will nOI cure thought from resignation as long as it is paid for with the secret knowled ge that th is course is simply no t the right one. Genera lly speakin g, pseudo-a ctivity is the attemp t to preserve enclaves of imm ediacy in the midst o f a thoroughly mediated and obd urate society. This process is rationali zed throu gh the acceptance of any small change as one step on the long way towa rd total change. The unfortunate mod el for pseud o-activity is the 'd o-it-you rself ' syndro me - activities that do that wh ich has long been done better through the means of industr ial produ ction and wh ich arou se in unfree individuals, hamp ered in their spo ntaneity. the confide nt feeling that they are of central concern. The non sense of the 'do -ityourself' approa ch to the production of material good s and in the making o f many repair s is eq ually obvious, However, it is not total. In view o f the reduction o f so -called services - sometimes su perfluo us in term s of techni cal standards measures taken by a private person fulfil a semi-rational pur pose. In politics. however. the 'd o-it-you rself" attitude is not of quite the same character. The society that confronts human being s in suc h an im penetrable mann er is these humans themselves. Confid ence in the limit ed action of small group s is reminiscent of the spo ntaneity whi ch atrop hi es beneath th e encrusted totalit y and without which this totalit y cann ot be transform ed into something different . The istered world has a tendency to strangle all spo ntane ity or at least to ch anne l it into pseudo- activity. This. however, is not ach ieved so totally wi tho ut difficulty as the agents of the istered world wou ld like to imagine. Nonetheless, spo ntaneit y is not to be absolut ized - just as little as it is to be separated from the objective situatio n and idoli zed in the same mann er as is the istered world itself. Orherwtse the axe will break down the next door in the hou se - a process wh ich never spares the carpe nter - and th e riot squad will appear on the spo t. Political acts of violence can also sink to the level of pseud o-activity, resulting in mere theatr e. It is hardl y a wond er that the ideal of direct action and propaganda glorifying the deed have been resurr ected, upon the heels of the willing integration of for merly progre ssive organ izations that, in all lands of the earth , manifest the chara cter of that against wh ich th ey were once dir ected . Th is process . ho wever. has nor weakened the criticism of

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anarchism, the return of whi ch is the return of a ghost. The impatience toward theory manifested in this return does nothing to advance th ought beyond itself. Theory falls beh ind the thought wh ich it forgets . For the indiv idual . life is mad e easier through capitulation to the collective wi th whi ch he ident ifies. He is spared the cognitio n of his impoten ce; wit hin the circle of their own co mpany. the few beco me man y. It is this act - no t unconfused thinking - wh ich is resignation . No tran sparent relation prevails between the interests of the ego and the collective to wh ich it assign s itself The ego must abrogat e itself. if tt is to share in the predestinati on of the collective. Explicitly a remnant of th e Kanuan categorical imperative rnanifesl5 itself: your signature is req uired. The feeling of a new secur ity is purchased wit h the sacrifice of autonomou s thin king. The consolation that thought withi n the context o f co llective acuon is an improvem ent proves deceptive: thinking. em ployed only as the tnsrrumen t of action. is blunted in the same mann er as all instrumental reason. At the present moment . no higher form of society is concre tely visible: for that reason, anything that seems in easy reach is regressive. According to Freud, however. whoever regresses has not achie ved the goal of his dr ives. Objectively viewed . reformation is renun ciation . even if it conside rs itself the opposite and inn ocently propagates the pleasure principle. In contrast, the uncompromi singly criti cal think er. wh o neith er superscribes his co nscie nce nor permits himself to be terrorized into action, is in truth the one who does not give up. Furthermore, thin king is not the spiritual reproducti on o f that which exists. As long as think ing is not interrupted, it has a firm grasp upon possfbiln y. Its insatiable quali ty. the resistance against pett y satiety, rejects the foolish wisdom of resiguatlon . The Utopian impulse in thinking is all the Stro nger, the less it objectifies itself as Utopi a - a furth er form of regression wh ereby it sabo tages its own realization. Ope n think ing points beyond itself, For its part, such thinking takes a position as a figuration of praxis which is mor e closely related to a prax is truly involved in change than in a position of mere obedience for the sake of praxis. Beyond all specialized and parti cular content . thinking is armally and above all the for ce of resistance, alienated from resistance o nly with grea t effort . Th is emphatic con cept of thinki ng is by no means secure; no secur ity is granted it by existing condinons nor by the ends yet to be attained nor

RESIGNATION

by any type of organized force. Whate ver was once thought. however, can be sup pressed: it can be forgonen and can even vanish. But it cannot be de nied that something of it surv ives. For th inking has the mom entum of the gen eral. What has been cogently thought mu st be thou ght in some other place and by othe r people. This confide nce accom panies even the lon eliest and mos t im potent thou ght. W hoever thin ks is with out anger in all cnticism;' thinking sublimates anger. Because the thinking pcrson doe s not have to inflict anger upon him self, he furth erm o re has no desire to inflict it upon othe rs. The happi ness visible to the eye of a thinker is the happiness of mankind. The universal tend ency toward suppression goes against thought as such . Such thought is happ iness. even where unhappiness pr evails; thought achi eves happiness in the expr ession of unhappiness. Wh oever refuses to permit this thought to he taken from him has not resign ed .

NOTE This sentence was recently used in DerSpiegel {1977. 4J as the head line for a brief article on the relation s hip of the Frankfurt School to terror as recently manifested in the German Federal Republic.

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