Rule 114 - Bail Digest Copy 2 1396l

Pandering versus C.A [Bail; as a matter of right; constructive custody of the law; expn] The case was all about the Petitioner who was the then Mayor of Gingoong City, and who was belatedly charged with the Amended information as coaccused for multiple murder of the Bucag family. The trial of the base was set to start with the issuance of warrant of arrest for the apprehension of the petitioner, but before the warrant is served upon her, petitioner through his council they filed a motion for the ission to bail before the trial court and which was then granted and set a date for hearing. In the course of the hearing 4 of the petitioners appeared for the reason that the accused was confined to the hospital at that time, and 1 assistant council for the prosecution. The PETITIONERS COUNCIL manifested that for purposes of hearing the accused is submitting himself to the custody of the law. The prosecution on the other hand waived it's right to present evidence. The trial court then granted the petitioners motion for ission to bail which was set for the amount of 200k. The accused then even if weak enough to walk personally presented him self to the clerk of court and posted bail. Then the trial was arraigned and that the trial ensued, he personally appear and attend all court hearings. The Prosecutor filed a special civil action for certiorari in CA and thus annulled the decision of the court who grants bail to the accused. WON: The Grant of Bail was tainted with Grave Abuse Discretion? Held: None. The court reversed and set aside the decision of the respondent CA As a paramount requisite, only those persons who has either been detained, arrested, or otherwise deprive their freedom will ever have the occasion to seek the protective mantle extended to the right to bail A person is considered under the custody of the law when he is apprehend, whether with or without a warrant, or when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering himself to proper authorities. In the case at bar, the petitioners filed a motion for the ission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may at this point considered under the constructively and legally under the custody of the law. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to the physical and legal control over his persons. For the purposes of the hearing thereof, he is deemed to have voluntarily submitted over his persons under to custody of the law and necessarily to the jurisdiction of the court thereafter granted his bail thereof.

The general rule is that prior conviction of the regional trial court for the offense charged, the accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. Present exceptions thereto being in the circumstance is that when the accused is charged with a capital offense or offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment or death and the evidence of guilt is strong, the right to bail becomes discretionary. The general rule is that upon a proper application for the ission to bail, with the court having the custody of the accused, should grant after the hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of bail of the accused. On the other hand the bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing mandatory in nature which should be summary otherwise x x x x . The burden of proof is with the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum. Commendador et. Al versus De Villa [Right to Bail;Military; Exception to the Bill of Rigthts; Justification] The was was all about 4 consolidated cases since it involves the same parties. The petitioners and private respondents faced the the prosecution for coup d at. The petitioners were of the Armed forces of the Phil. Which faced charges for Violation of war and murder. Before the charges were set to, a Pre-Trial Investigation was constituted, with the duty to conduct investigations against the petitioners. In the course of the investigation, Petitioners light questioned the conduct of the PTI, where in he applied for bail and but was then denied by GCM 14. The petitioner applied for a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a prayer of provisional liberty and injunction before the RTCourt and as such was granted. However De Villa refused to release petitioners for provisional Liberty pending final resolution of appeal to have undertaken before the court invoking that the military officers are exempt from the right to bail granted under the constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating the provisional release of the petitioners stating that their was a mistake in the presumption of the respondents that bail does not apply among military men facing charges before the higher court. WON: The Military men are exempt from the Constitutional Guarantee on the right of Bail Held: Yes, the court reversed the decision of the lower court For the release of the petitioners. The Bail invoked by the petitioners is not available to the military as an exemption to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right of speedy trial is given more emphasis in military where the right to bail does not exist. Justification to this rule involves a unique structure of the military and national security considerations which may result to damaging precedents that mutinous

soldiers be released on provisional Liberty given them the chance to continue to their plot in overthrowing the government. Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate with in the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from people. All other insurgent elements carried out their activities outside of and against existing political system. Triplanes IV versus Pimentel [No Distinction In Jalosjos; Constitution; Right & Discretion] The case was all about the 300 armed men who is leaded by a junior official of the AFP, stormed over the oak ridge premier apartments to demand the resignation of the president and national officials. The then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo then declared the state of rebellion. After the aftermath the incident is called the oak ridge incident, petitioner Trillaner IV was charged with coup dettat before the RTC. Trillanes for four years was detained. Petitioner then throws his hat to the senate and then won the election as a senator. Before the commencement of his term, he filed an omnibus motion with leave of court before the RTC so that he could attend the Senate Session. How ever the court denied his motion and he then filed a motion for recommendation and however was still denied. He then filed before the SC WON There is a distinction between the case of Jalosjos who was then Convicted at the time he filed his motion and In the instant case. Held: The Distinctions cited by the petitioners were not elemental in the pronouncement Of Jalosjos that election to congress is not a reasonable reclassification in Criminal Law enforcement as the functions and duties of office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of Prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted from their liberty movement. The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offense punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable with sufficient sureties or release on recognizance as maybe prescribed by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired event if the right to habeas corpus is The rule also states that No person charged with capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment shall be

denied to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of what ever stage of criminal action. Such rule applies equally to coup dettat and rape and other offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of penalty, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude in the offense charged. In the present case it is uncontroverted that the petitioners application to bail and for recognizance for the release was denied. The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained at the hearing of an application for bail imported from a courts judgement of conviction, justifies the detention of the accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty, This accentuates the provision that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is “regardless of any stage of criminal action.” Such Justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies to all equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes – detained. or Jalosjos – convicted. Necessary consequence of arrest or detention is that any person cannot engage in business, office, profession or hold office, whether appointive or elective while in detention. Docent-Caspe versus Bugtas [Duties of the Judge in application for bail;Hearing is indispensable in for a grant or denial of bail; Gross ignorance of law; Failure to Adduce evidence.] The facts of the case was all about an istrative Case against the judge for gross ignorance of the law. Such case stemmed from a murder case against Celso and Juan Docel for the death of Lucio Docena. The complainant alleged that Judge Alvarez of MTC of Samar, is the one who conducted the Preliminary investigation against the murder case and latter then issued a warrant of arrest against Juan and Celso Docel. No bail was recommended to both of them who remained at large. The information then was filed before the RTC Samar which was presided by judge Alvarez, who in turn granted bail bond to each of both accused for the amount of 60k. The Provencial prosecutor then filed before the RTC which was presided by RESPONDENT JUSDGE BUGTAS, a motion of alias warrant to be issued against the other accused and that both of the accused be denied of bail. Said motion was then granted by the judge. Celso who was apprehended filed a motion for reconsideration praying that he be allowed to bail as a matter of right and that both of the First investigating judge and Assistant prosecutor recommended bail for 60k for his temporary release.

However it was denied by the RTC judge, contending that there is nothing on the records would show that there is previous recommendation of the grant of bail for his temporary Liberty. The accused then filed an MR Stating the same contentions. Filed a manifestation that there is a previous recommendation of bail against him and the co-accused. Prosecution failed to present evidence. RTC granted the said motion of the accused and granted bail ON THE BASIS OF PREVIOUS ORDER GRANTING BAIL TO THE ACCUSED. The complainant filed an istrative case against the respondent judge contending that respondent judge granted bail to the accused without conducting a bail hearing. WON: hearing is required in granted bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion Held: YES, jurisprudence replete with decisions of necessity of an hearing wether summary or otherwise, relevant to the grant of bail especially on the cases involving offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, or imprisonment, where bail is a matter of right or discretion, under the present rules , hearing is required in granting bail whether bail is a matter of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence on the guilt of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Clearly therefore, the respondent Judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged belated objection of the prosecution to the order dated July 22, 1994 issued by his predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez; nor on the prosecution’s failure to file a comment to the accused’s motion for reconsideration of the August 11, 2000 order denying the application for bail. Clearly therefore, the respondent Judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged belated objection of the prosecution to the order dated July 22, 1994 issued by his predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez; nor on the prosecution’s failure to file a comment to the accused’s motion for reconsideration of the August 11, 2000 order denying the application for bail. It is certainly erroneous for the respondent to rely on the order of Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. As a responsible judge, he should have looked into the real and hard facts of the case before him and ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong.14 To make things worse, respondent Judge relied on the said July 22, 1994 order despite the fact

that the same appears to have been issued by his predecessor Judge also without a hearing and while the accused was at large. In addition to the requirement of a mandatory bail hearing, respondent judge should have known the basic rule that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.15 In Basco v. Rapatalo,16 the Court laid down the following rules which outlined the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed: (1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation; (2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion; (3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; (4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied. Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution.17 A summary is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement. Based on the summary of evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.18 In the instant case, it appears that when the respondent judge initially granted the prosecution’s motion praying that the accused be denied bail, no hearing was conducted. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or weakness of evidence of the accused’s guilt, he should have conducted a hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail. The judge was ordered to pay the complainant 20k and sternly warned. People versus Judge Gako & Go [The duties of the judge in granting bail; Hearing Mandatory; Custody of the law]

The case stems from a murder case filed against the private responded go for the killing of Galan Sr. who died. The murder case was originally being handled or presided by judge Agna. In the course of prosecution, judge Anna repeatedly sustained the objections of the defense every time the prosecution attempt to establish the conspiracy to kill the victim. The prosecution then sought to inhibit Judge Anna alleging the collusion between the accused. However the inhibition was denied. The prosecution sought to challenge the decision of judge Agna, went to file before the CA and then rendered a decision inhibiting judge and reraffled the case. The decision of the CA gained finality when the accused appealed before the SC. The case was then set for retrial. A series of delays was acquired by the case when the judge to whom the case was reraffled inhibited himself. The case was finally presided by respondent Judge Gako. There was an urgent motion to enforce the alias warrant of arrest against the respondent Go praying that the private respondent go should be arrested before his Clinical Summary Report Could be heard. The Respondent Judge issued an order granting Bail against the private respondent Go. The prosecution moved for reconsideration for the decision of the judge in granting bail against private respondent accused . However this was denied by the respondent Judge. Private complainant then went to the CA seeking to a null the decisions of the respondent Judge, however C.A dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Motion for recon was filed. But was denied by the Respondent C.A WON: WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 10, 1997 GRANTING BAIL IS PROPER WITHOUT EXPRESSING THE COURTS FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT OF THE ACCUSED IS NOT STRONG. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT VICENTE GO IS CONSIDERED UNDER LEGAL CUSTODY AS OF NOVEMBER 20, 1992 UNTIL THE PRESENT BECAUSE OF HIS HOSPITAL CONFINEMENT BY ORDER OF THE COURT DATED AUGUST 6, 1991. Held: First, the assailed Order dated November 10, 1997 granting bail is legally infirm for failing to conform with the requirement that in cases when the granting of bail is not a matter of right, a hearing for that purpose must first be conducted. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides the instances when bail is a matter of right or discretionary, to wit: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reiterates that: No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be itted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. Based on the foregoing, bail is not a matter of right with respect to persons charged with a crime the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, when the evidence of guilt is strong. Private respondent Go, accused in the criminal case, was charged with murder in 1991, before the age of RA 7659, the law that re-imposed the death penalty. Murder then was a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, accused Gos right to bail is merely discretionary. It is inconceivable how Judge Gako, Jr. could have appreciated the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt of the accused when he did not even bother to hear the prosecution. The reliance of Judge Gako, Jr. on the voluminous records of the case simply does not suffice. As judge, he was mandated to conduct a hearing on the petition for bail of the accused since he knew that the crime charged is one that carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and in that hearing, the prosecution is entitled to present its evidence. It is worth stressing that the prosecution is equally entitled to due process.[18] Another compelling reason why a hearing of a petition for bail is necessary is to determine the amount of bail based on the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.[19] Without the required hearing, the bail granted to accused Go in the amount of P 50,000.00 is undoubtedly arbitrary and without basis. Second, the order granting bail issued by Judge Gako, Jr. merely made a conclusion without a summary of the evidence, a substantive and formal defect that voids the grant of bail. Well settled is the rule that after the hearing, whether the bail is granted or denied, the presiding judge is mandated to prepare a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. A summary is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement.[20] Based on the summary of evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The importance of a summary cannot be downplayed, it is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail. Leviste vs. CA [3rd Par. Of Section 5 rule 114; Interpretation; bail as a matter of discretion or should be denied; Dismissed]

The case was all about the petitioner who was charged with murder before the RTC but was convicted with homicide for the killing of de las alas and sentenced to suffer a indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to reclusion temporal to 12 years and 1 days as maximum. Petitioner appealed to CA, but pending the appeal he applied urgent application for the ission to bail. He claimed that due to his age and health, there is low probability of risk of flight for his part. CA denied his application to bail and invoked the bedrock principle that the extension to grant bail during the pending appeal shall be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reason. The CA considered the Petitioners Conviction. It made a preliminary investigation on its case and made a prima facie determination that was no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of pet. Guilt. Pet. Filed an m.r but was denied. WON: in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court? Held: No Sec. 5 rules of court: bail when discretionary Upon conviction of the accused before the Regional Trial Court, of an offense NOT punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, ISSION TO BAIL IS DISCRETIONARY. ----x x x x x --IF THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS IMPRISONMENT EXCEEDING SIX YEARS, THE ACCUSED SHALL BE DENIED BAIL, OR HIS BAIL SHALL BE CANCELLED UPON A SHOWING BY THE PROSECUTION, WITH NOTICE TO THE ACCUSED, OF THE FOLLOWING OR SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES. (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances. e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5); f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x[24] (emphasis supplied) Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.[25] (emphasis supplied) In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating[26] circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion. On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if

the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed. Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice;[27] on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail. On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal. The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on the part of the court. The court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its appreciation of the facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter.[31] In view of the grave caution required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is affirmed.[32] It should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the particular case, such as the record, character and reputation of the applicant,[33] among other things. More importantly, the discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial determination that the appeal is not frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which must be determined by the appellate court.[34] In other words, a threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro

forma and merely intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue. [35] This must be so; otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more significantly, this comports with the very strong presumption on appeal that the lower courts exercise of discretionary power was sound,[36] specially since the rules on criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except for substantial error.[37] Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides: SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.[46] From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial courts initial determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes. Bongcac vs Sandiganbayan [Cancellation of Bail; Immutability of Final Judgement; Dismissed] The case was all about Petitioner Bongcac who was the then secretary of the mayor of tagbilaran city and was appointed by the mayor to represent him in City Market Committee, Consultant and Coordinator on market matters, and adviser to the Acting Market . Respondents engr. Lim and Bon applied for marketing stalls in tagbilaran city where

they negotiated with the petitioners. The private respondents then issued a check to Bongcac for the promise that they will construct the stall in the market. However at the time relevant to the case Bongcacs promise did not materialize, both bon and lim asked Bongcac for the return of the money or the constructed stalls. Bongcac fail to furnish the money that is being given by Bon and Lim. Bon and Lim initiated a case against Bongcac for Estafa before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan rendered a judgement, guilty beyon reasonable doubt against Bongcac for 2 criminal cases filed against him. Bongcac filed a motion for recon but was denied. petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari[4] with SC, which was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149711-12. The petition sought the reversal of the 28 March 2001 Decision of the Sandiganbayan. But it was denied. the Sandiganbayan issued a notice to petitioner and counsel directing them to be present on 8 January 2003 for the execution of judgment in the criminal cases. petitioner filed in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 a Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief with this Court. The petition sought to reverse and set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan and to declare that petitioner is acquitted of the offense charged. petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, in Criminal Case Nos. 18005 and 18006, a Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings praying that the execution of judgment be held in abeyance to await the action of this Court on the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief he filed in G.R. Nos. 149711-12.[9] the Fourth Division[10] of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Criminal Case Nos. 18005 and 18006 denying, for lack of merit, petitioners Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings. It further directed the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner to serve the sentence imposed upon him. The cash bond posted by petitioner for his temporary liberty was ordered cancelled. Petitioner was given five days to voluntarily surrender. this Court issued a Resolution in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 denying, for lack of merit, the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief. Petitioner then went to S.C WON: The resolution of the present petition hinges on the sole issue of whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying petitioners motion to hold in abeyance the execution of judgment. Held: Petitioner cannot perpetually file any petition or pleading to forestall the execution of a final judgment. Execution of a final judgment is the fruit

and end of the suit. While a litigants right to initiate an action in court is fully respected, once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, he should not be permitted to initiate similar suits in the hope of securing a favorable ruling. The 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision has attained finality. Such definitive judgment is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment. In Lim v. Jabalde,[13] this Court further explained the necessity of adhering to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, thus: Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere and it is essential to an effective and efficient istration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. For just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the life of the law.[14] To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that we should write finis to this litigation. Consequently, we find no grave abuse of discretion when the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion to hold in abeyance the execution of judgment. On the cancellation of petitioners cash bailbond as ordered in the Resolution of 10 January 2003 of the Sandiganbayan, the cancellation of the bailbond was due to the execution of the final judgment of conviction. Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides: SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail. - Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death. The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail. (emphasis supplied). From this provision, it is clear that the cancellation of bail is automatic upon execution of the judgment of conviction. The Sandiganbayan did not err in cancelling petitioners cash bailbond after the judgment of conviction became final and executory and its execution became ministerial.