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Modernization: Theories and Facts Author(s): Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi Reviewed work(s): Source: World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Jan., 1997), pp. 155-183 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25053996 . Accessed: 09/03/2012 19:43 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please [email protected].

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MODERNIZATION Theories

and Facts

By ADAM PRZEWORSKI andFERNANDO LIMONGI*

Introduction T

JL

THAT makes political regimes rise, endure, and fall?Do democ

V V

racies

as a consequence of economic development? destabilize democracies? Is there some growth

emerge

rapid economic

Does level of

development beyond which democracies aremore likely to fall? Is Eu ropean veloped Our

history unique countries?

or is it repeating

itself

in contemporary

less de

two theories is to distinguish that relate economic de purpose some facts in to examine and and these of velopment democracy light concern theories. While the interesting the mech ultimately questions anisms that mediate between economic and the dynamics development we must nevertheless of political the facts to be ex regimes, identify we before into stick as close as Hence, plained plunging explanations. nar to pose the question patterns. We possible elementary descriptive the impact of development, rather than rowly, examining exclusively seeking

to

broadly

deliberately the world

explain ignore factors income system,

to influence

by others that our question answers, vergent well understood. found

In Section

we the dynamic of political regimes. Hence, such as religion, in colonial legacy, position or diffusion, which have been distribution,

the incidence of democracy We believe to di in its own is important it that lends itself right, are not and that it raises methodological issues that

I, we

reconstruct

two alternative

views

of the relation

be

tween development and democracy, both put forth by Lipset,1 and we count

the cases

that fit them.

In Section

II we

examine

the vulnerabil

* We Cheibub, Fernando Cort?s, Larry Dia appreciate comments by Mike Alvarez, Jos? Antonio mond, John H. Kautsky, Seymour Martin Lipset, Alejandro Lopez, Jos? Maria Maravall, Guillermo and Susan Stokes. This work was ed in part by a grant from the National Science O'Donnell, no. SES-9022605. Foundation 1 of Democracy: Economic Development and Po Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites litical Legitimacy,'' American Political Science Review 53 (March 1959); and idem, Political Man: Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore: Johns Press, 1981). Hopkins University

WorldPolitics 49 (January1997), 155-83

The

WORLD POLITICS

156

to economic crises. In Section the III we consider ity of democracies most in criticisms and Section substantive of 's views, important Lipset

IV we study methodological reflections

close

criticisms. Methodological

the paper. Appendix

1 explains

and political

our classification

of

regimes, while Appendix 2 spells out the analytics of regime dynamics. I. Economic

Development

and Democracy

observation that democracy is related to economic develop Lipset's in 1959, has generated the largest body of research ment, first advanced on any and con It has been ed topic in comparative politics. while several revised and buried and And resuscitated. tested, extended, to in the recent Festschrift neither conclusions, Lipset proclaim the theory nor the facts are clear.2 Even a glance at the aggregate such as Figure 1, shows that patterns, the relation between levels of development and the incidence of demo

articles

a of regimes is strong.3 Indeed, condi regimes probit analysis as on the per we to refer which throughout only capita income, 77 of annual the level of development, 4,126 percent correctly classifies

cratic

tional

observations.4

The probability is chance greater than 0.99. by Yet there are two distinct democracies nomically,

may or

that

this classification

is not generated

reasons

this relation may hold: either eco as countries to emerge develop likely de be established of economic independently

be more

they may

2 in Gary Marks and "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," Larry Diamond, eds., Reexamining Larry Diamond, Lipset (Newbury Democracy: Essays inHonor of Seymour Martin Park, Calif: Sage Publications, 1992). 3 lead to somewhat divergent results, the While different data sets and different estimation methods most

finds that careful statistical study of the aggregate patterns thus far, by Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, causes democracy. Ross E. Burkhart and Michael economic S. Lewis-Beck, Granger development Thesis," American Political Science Review 88 "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development (December 1994), 903-10. 4 and democ the relation between development A fair amount of ink has been spilled over whether to Democratic of Economic Development racy is linear. See Robert W. Jackman, "On the Relation and Zehra F. Arat, Science 17 (August 1973), 611-21; American Journal of Political Performance," Modernization Theory Revisited," Comparative Politics 21 "Democracy and Economic Development: is a qualitative or a lim however measured, (October 1988), 21-36. We now know better. Democracy, it ranges from 2 to 14 on the Freedom ited variable: it assumes values of 0 or 1 under our measurement; House Scale created by R. D. Gastil, Freedom in theWorld: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1987-88 (New York: Freedom House, 1988); from 0 to 100 on the scale of Kenneth A. Bollen, "Issues in the American Sociological Review 45 (June 1980), of Political Democracy," Measurement Comparative can become negative as the level of de no and so on. Hence, index of democracy 370-90, predicted can exceed whatever is the maximum index of democracy tends to zero, and no predicted velopment value of a particular scale as the level gets very large. Only a nonlinear function, such as the normal or as can satisfy these constraints. See Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven: logistic, suggested by Robert A. Dahl iswhy we use probit or logit models Yale University Press, 1971). This throughout.

MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS

157

1.00000 0.94737 0.88421 0.82105 0.75789 0.69474 0.63158 0.56842 0.50526 0.44211

*

* *

0.37895 0.31579 0.25263 0.18947 0.12632 0.06315

*

*

2,0000

4,000 Level:

Probability

that

a Regime

a1985 PPP USD-purchasing-power

*

*

parities

6,000 8,000

GNP/cap

in 1985

1 Figure is Democratic, inU.S.

PPP USD*

by Per Capita

Income

dollars.

to survive in but may be more countries. velopment likely developed We call the first explanation and the second "endogenous" "exogenous." two Since we are dealing with democracies emerge only regimes, to assert that democracies whenever die.5 Hence, emerge dictatorships as a result of economic is the same as to say that dictator development as countries ruled by them become ships die economically developed. out of is then secreted Democracy by economic develop dictatorships ment. A story told about country after country is that as they develop, to social structure becomes labor processes require the begin complex, of employees, and new groups emerge and organize. cooperation a result, the can no run system longer be effectively by command: too the society is the direct pro complex, technological change endows some autonomy ducers with and private civil society information, and control dictatorial of forms lose their effectiveness. Vari emerges, ous groups, whether or the bourgeoisie, workers, just the amorphous "civil society," rise against the dictatorial and it falls. regime, a "modernization" The is endogenous theory. The basic explanation of in this its is of that there is one gen versions, any assumption theory, active

As

5 is not quite true of our data set, since different countries enter and exit the sample at differ This ent moments. For now, we consider the population of countries as fixed, but see Section IV.

WORLD POLITICS

158

eral process of which democratization

is but the final stage.Modern

ization consists of a gradual differentiation structures in a separation that culminates other

structures consist

chains

and makes

a society ready Modernization lated

impute

paraphrases

urbanization,

educa

among incorporation, that of social changes accumulation progressive to to its culmination, democratization. proceed is re of democracy may be one reason the incidence

to economic

tators

democracy of industrialization, and political mobilization,

of sequences

tion, communication, others: innumerable

of social and specialization structures from of political causal The specific possible.

to

a

commen and this is the reading most most influential critic, O'Donnell, as as countries become other that "if saying

development, His Lipset.6 s thesis

Lipset

rich as the economically advanced nations, it is highly probable that

democracies."7 then, is endoge Democracy, they will become political Ac since it results from development under authoritarianism. nous, one one to this events is the of would sequence expect theory, cording democratic countries and of poor authoritarian becoming developing a "threshold." some level of once they reach development, are to die and democra that dictatorships equally likely so many cies to emerge at any level of development. They may die for conse reasons with all its modernizing that development, different as no Therborn role. After all, quences, emphasized, plays privileged not because of of countries because democratized wars, many European a in the Malv defeat the "modernization," story repeated by Argentine of the fell in the aftermath inas and elsewhere.8 Some dictatorships Yet

suppose

for instance?who had been dictator?a of a founding Franco, order. Some dictatorial of the collapsed maintaining capable uniquely crises. Some because of foreign pressures. because of economic to die and democracies If dictatorships emerge randomly with regard more be democracies is it still possible that there would development, one is to take ones? If countries than among poor among wealthy a nation, more well-to-do at his own word?"The the greater Lipset even if the emergence of the chances itwill sustain democracy"9?then death

democracy is independent of the level of development, the chance that 6 and John D. Stephens, Diamond (fn. 2), 45; as well as Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, on "The Impact of Economic Development Democracy," Journal ofEconomic Perspectives 7 (Summer 1993), 71-86. 7 Studies in South American and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization of California, Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International 1973), 3. Studies, University 8 Goran Therborn, "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy," New Left Review, no. 103 (May-June 9 Lipset

1977). (fh. 1,1959),

56.

MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS

159

such a regime will survive is greater if it has been established in an af fluent

country. We

thus expect

would

to observe

democracies

to appear

randomly with regard to levels of development, but to die in the poorer ac ones. Thus, history gradually a since every time cumulates democracies, dictatorship happens wealthy to die in an affluent country, is there to stay (see democracy Appendix emer is therefore no longer a modernization 2). This theory, since the not is about by development. of democracy Rather, gence brought as a deus ex machina. survives if a It appears exogenously democracy a not it is is of "modernization." but "modern," country product countries

in the wealthier

and survive

Are we splitting hairs? Examine

first some descriptive

patterns.

The

facts we

report

concern

135 countries between roughly 1950 and 1990. "Entry" year refers to or to the first country became independent, are and "exit" year refers to data available, year the data are available. All the regimes that 1990 or to the last year when or dictator as democracies occurred during this period were classified use term with "authoritarian latter the (we interchangeably ships we observed 101 democratic 224 regimes, and regimes").10 Altogether, 1950,

or to the year when economic for which

123 authoritarian. rates are power

The

a

expressed and expressed

parities

to levels of and growth development at dollars computed purchasing in 1985 prices. refer (Thus all $ numbers

references

in constant

U.S.

to 1985 PPPUSD.) The lowest level we observed in the entire sample is $226 (Burma in 1950), the highest is $18,095 (United States in 1989).11 as a result of economic devel If the theory that democracy emerges more to be is transitions would true, opment democracy likely when In levels of authoritarian reach fact, tran development. regimes higher as per rises income of sitions are increasingly likely capita dictatorships but only until it reaches a level of about $6,000. Above that, dictator more as countries become more affluent. Dictator become stable ships 10 1 and in in Appendix and the resulting list of regimes are described Our regime classification Alvarex et al., "Classifying Political Regimes," Studies in International Comparative Development reason for selecting this period and the sample is the availability of internationally (forthcoming). The we describe we took from the Penn World Tables 5.6. The sample comparable economic data, which here and use throughout does not include six countries that derive at least half of their income from oil are available for 4,730 country years, data for economic growth are avail revenues. While political data in most analyses. is the number of observations able for only 4,126 country years, which 11 Readers used to the UN or theWorld Bank GNP figures should be aware that counting incomes at to increase significantly the levels for poor countries and to decrease purchasing-power parities tends to know what different slighdy the numbers for rich countries. It may be useful for future reference numbers describe: by 1990, Nigeria had a per capita income of $995, Indonesia had $1,973, Czecho slovakia $4,094, Spain $9,576, and the United States $18,073.

Mike

WORLD POLITICS

160 survive,

ships

or at least succeed

one another,12

in the invariably are somewhat less stable almost

those under $1,000. They very poor countries, in countries with incomes between and $4,000 $1,001

and even

less so

above $4,000. But if they reach the level of $6,000, transitions to democracy become less likely.As the lower of Table 1 (PADcol umn 4) shows, the probability of any dictatorship dying during any year is 0.0206; for those dictatorships with incomes over $1,000, this prob over ability is 0.0294, over $5,000 it is 0.0641, over $6,000 it is 0.0484, $7,000

it is 0.0333.

it seems, was

Huntington,

correct with

regard

to

dictatorships: they exhibit a "bell shaped pattern of instability"13 To we

these patterns can be predicted by per capita income, on level and, the transition conditional given probabilities

test whether

estimate

the nonlinearity The results are

of the observed

its square (see Appendix 2). patterns, of dic 2. As we see, the probabilities

inTable

presented

tatorships falling, p^, predicted by the level of development correspond to those observed. closely and then decline. Indeed,

dictatorships

wealthy. Whatever

They

increase

survived

until

for years

the $5,001-$6,000 in countries

range that were

the threshold at which development is supposed to

it is clear that many dictator regimes, that those countries Even disregarding ships ed good revenues more from than one-half derive of their oil, dictatorships in East flourished USSR, Taiwan, , Singapore, Spain, Bulgaria, in and Mexico for many years after these countries enjoyed Argentina, comes above $5,000, which Austria, Ice , , Belgium, dig

the grave

for authoritarian

it in

health.

land, Italy,Netherlands, and Norway did not have by 1950. Table 3 lists the dictatorships that survived even though the probability that the

was above regime is democratic predicted by the level of development to income of which $4,115. 0.50, per capita corresponds Yet this may not be a fair test of modernization theory. The hypoth over a esis implied by this theory is that ifa country develops longer pe so that all the have riod under dictatorship, consequences modernizing most dic But for time to accumulate, then itwill embrace democracy. this premise is vacuous: only 19 dictatorships?to tatorships over out of 123?did of time and longer periods develop us more these examine thus countries, closely "modernity." Let that developed

under

authoritarianism

and became

"modern,"

remind, reached the ones which

12 If President Viola succeeds President successive dictatorships. that we do not distinguish Note Videla or even if ayatollahs succeed a shah, we treat it as one continuous spell of dictatorship. 13 Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Samuel P. Huntington, Press, 1968), 43.

MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS Regime

1

Table by Lagged

Transitions

Per Capita

(annual

Income

(Level)"

data) TRD

TA

PDA

TRA

TD

0.0066 0.0248 0.0276 0.0161 0.0492 0.0641 0.0625 0.0333

6 18 8 3 6 5 2 1

915 727 290 186

0.1250 0.0571 0.0380 0.0333 0.0187 0.0088 0.0083 0.0000

9 14 7 5 2 1 1 0

72 245 184 150 107 113 121 619

3991

0.0206

49

2380

0.0242

39

1611

3004 2032 1558 1222 993 802 649

0.0294 0.0339 0.0379 0.0534 0.0571 0.0484 0.0333

43 25 17 14 8 3 1

1465 738 448 262 140 62 30

0.0195 0.0124 0.0081 0.0042 0.0023 0.0014 0.0000

30 16 9

1539 1294 1110 960 853 740 619

PJK

TTR

TOT

PAD

-1000 1001-2000 2001-3000 3001-4000 4001-5000 5001-6000 6001-7000 7001

0.0152 0.0329 0.0316 0.0238 0.0349 0.0314 0.0196 0.0015

15 32 15

987 972 474 336 229 191 153 649

AU

0.0221

88

0.0243 0.0202 0.0167 0.0147 0.0101 0.0050 0.0015

73 41 26 18 10 4 1

Low-High

161

122 78 32 30

Above

1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000

is lagged, we

"Since per capita income are used: abbreviations

lose 135 observations,

that either regime dies during PJK is the probability TTR is the number of transitions TOT is the total number

of regime years at a particular of transition to democracy

PAD is the probability TRD is their number TA is the total number PDA is the probability TRA is their number TD is the total number

we will

a

for the total of 3,991. The

particular

following

year

level

of years under authoritarianism of transition to authoritarianism of years under democracy

take arbitrarily

to mean

that at some

time

a per they had capita

income of $4,115. (SeeTable 4.) Gabon, Syria, enced a sustained teen, more

and eighteen

are the three countries and Yugoslavia that experi increase in income over, respectively, twelve, seven was the at which years, reached the level democracy

remained under likely regime, and, having experi dictatorships, a series of economic are the two crises. and Malaysia Singapore over a countries that became wealthy, and re long period, developed now. mained In East until USSR, Spain, Taiwan, dictatorships , and but fell, Bulgaria, dictatorships eventually only many Hungary enced

WORLD POLITICS

162

Table Regime

Transition _Per

Level

2

Probabilities

Capita

Income

by Lagged

Predicted and

Its

Square3_ PM N PD*

PDA 0.098

PAD 0.010

PDD 0.902

0.990

0.092

987

(0.125) 0.072

(0.007) 0.017

(0.875) 0.928

(0.993) 0.983

(0.053) 0.191

972

(0.057)

(0.025)

(0.943)

(0.975)

(0.304)

2001-3000

0.044

0.028

0.956

0.972

0.388

474

3001-4000

(0.038) 0.026

(0.028) 0.039

(0.962) 0.974

(0.972) 0.961

(0.424) 0.600

336

4001-5000

(0.033) 0.015

(0.016) 0.047

(0.967) 0.985

(0.984) 0.953

(0.326) 0.758

229

5001-6000

(0.019) 0.008

(0.049) 0.050

(0.981) 0.992

(0.951) 0.950

(0.720) 0.862

191

6001-7000

(0.009) 0.004

(0.064) 0.047

(0.991) 0.996

(0.936) 0.953

(0.876) 0.921

153

7001-

(0.008) 0.0006

(0.063) 0.017

(0.992) 0.999

(0.937) 0.983

(0.887) 0.965

649

(0.000)

(0.033)

(1.000)

(0.967)

(1.000)

<1000 1001-2000

All

0.051

0.028

0.959

0.977

0.354

(0.024)

(0.021)

(0.976)

(0.979)

(0.466)

3991

* Based on a dynamic probit model. See Appendix 2. The probabilities pv j=A,D, k=A,D sitions and survival. is the equilibrium proportion of democracies. Observed transition p*D Table 1) are in parentheses.

are of tran rates (from

years after they had reached the critical level of income. Given its 1974 income

level, Uruguay

should

never

have been

a

dictatorship.

The

eco

nomic history of the Chilean dictatorship is convoluted: its income in 1974 was $3,561, it climbed with downs and ups to $4,130 by 1981, collapsed to $3,199 by 1983, recovered to sur the 1974 level only by 1986, and ed the threshold of $4,155 in 1989, exactly the year of transition.

The

the threshold

is similar: by our criteria, it reached history of Poland an economic in 1974; it experienced of democracy crisis

in 1979 and a mass movement for democracy in 1980, ed the threshold again in 1985, and became a democracy in 1989. In turn, Brazil, Greece

Czechoslovakia, are the dream

and perhaps Portugal, cases of a modernization

that developed under a dictatorship, off more or less at the same threw dictatorships are few. countries

This

is not

to say that democracies

did not

even

South

Korea

and

theorist.

These

are

wealthy, levels. But

and

became income sometimes

emerge

they be

MODERNIZATION:

Highest

163

3 Table of Per Capita Income (Level) under Which in different dictatorships survived countries Highest Level 11698 10433 8598 8067 7744 7390 6969 6939 6866 6505 6463 6434 5815 5674

Year

1990 1988 1979 1990 1989 1976 1976 1957 1988 1980 1981 1976 1972 1979 1987 1973 1981 1990 1978 1987 1981 1974 1962 1957 1981

Singapore East Iraq Taiwan USSR

Spain Gabon Venezuela Bulgaria Argentina Mexico Iran Argentina Yugoslavia Hungary Greece Uruguay Malaysia

Poland Korea

Syria Portugal Argentina Argentina Suriname * The

& FACTS

Levels

Country

South

THEORIES

prob(reg=dem)?

0.992 0.977 0.923

0.895 0.875 0.851 0.818 0.815 0.809 0.776 0.772 0.769 0.705 0.690 0.687 0.637 0.630 0.625 0.623 0.620 0.569 0.568 0.553 0.530 0.513

5650 5218 5162 5117 5102 5080 4668 4657 4541

4355 4220

is the probability that a regime is democratic given the level. It is calculated as PROB(reg=DEM) where the parameters are estimated by the probit model and F(.) is the cdf of the nor

l-F(a+?*LEVEL), mal distribution.

cause

do not modern; put otherwise, dictatorships fall for the same reasons in all countries. Thus moderniza

countries

necessarily tion may

became

"explain" why

democracy

was

established

in countries

that de

even it these countries had waited for its veloped over a long period But ifmoderniza of time that cannot be predicted. periods must be some level of there is to have any predictive power, theory sure can one at the that be relatively income which country will throw

advent

for

tion

off the dictatorship. One is hard put to find this level, however: among the countries

that

satisfy

the premise

of the modernization

theory,

the

range of levels atwhich dictatorships survived is very wide (see the list inTable 4).

WORLD POLITICS

164

Countries

That

4 Table over Long

Developed and Reached

Incomes

Entry Country Gabon Brazil

Chile Uruguay South Korea Malaysia Singapore

Syria Taiwan Bulgaria Czechoslovakia East



Greece Hungary

Poland Portugal

Spain USSR Yugoslavia

under Periods above $4,115a Peak

es

Year

Level

1961 1965 1974

1969 1864 3561

1974 1961 1957 1965 1961 1952 1981 1964 1971 1967 1971 1971

4148 911 1282 1845 1607 968 4216 1654 4995 3308 3657 3109

1951 1951 1961 1961

1314 2205 2536 2073

Dictatorship

PROB=0.50

1973 1980 1981 1989 1974 1985 1982 1972 1978 1979 ? 1989 ? 1970 1974 1974 1985 1973 1964 1971 1974

Transition

Year

PROB

1976 1980 1981 1989 1981 1988 1990 1990 1981 1990 1989 1989 1988 1974 1987 1978 1988 1974 1976 1989 1979

0.82

never

0.52

0.47

0.53

1978 no 1989

0.63

1985

0.48 0.68

0.50

at PROB

Year

0.68

1988

0.63

never

0.99

never

0.53

0.57

never

0.90

post 1990 1989 1989 1990 1974 1989 no 1989

0.80 0.51 0.98 0.61 0.69 0.62 0.55

0.57 0.85 0.88 0.69

1975

0.80 0.51 } 0.61 0.68

0.55

0.52 0.85

1976 collapsed

collapsed

that grew over the period of at least seven years and at some time reached income of $4,115. per capita Entry is 1951 or the year after the country became independent or the year after economic data became available. es PROB=0.50 is the year when the country reached per capita income of $4,115. Peak gives the time when the country reached the highest income level under aThis table lists countries

and the probability, as predicted dictatorship transition gives the year the dictatorship democracy. Finally, racy at that time. the particular

Moreover,

even

if to

predict

is not

by per capita income, that itwould be a fell, if ever, and the probability of democ

the same

as to

explain,

"explain

ing" can easily entail an ex post fallacy.Consider Taiwan, which in 1961 had a per capita income of $968, which developed rapidly, ing by 1979 our threshold of $4,115, which on the basis of its income level had a probability of 0.10 of being a dictatorship in 1990, andwhich in 1995

elected

its president

in contested

elections

for the first

time.

Sup

pose that every year during all this time, the Taiwanese dictatorship faced a probability of 0.02 of dying for reasons not related to develop ment.

It thus had

about

a 50 percent

chance

of not

being

around

by

1995 even if it had not developed at all.We may therefore attribute to development

what

may

have

been

just

a culmination

of random

haz

MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS

165

ards.And, indeed, theTaiwanese dictatorship most likely democratized ones.14 reasons, not for economic geopolitical of economic the causal Thus, power development down appears paltry. Few authoritarian torships

for

of modernization

premise

theory;

in bringing

dicta

regimes satisfy the over a that is, few developed long pe

riod. And even ifmost of those that did develop eventually became

no level of income occur. that would democracies, predicts when of the level of development, In turn, per capita income, our measure is The has a strong impact on the survival of democracies. simple fact that during the period under our scrutiny or ever before, no democracy ever fell, else, in a country with a per capita in regardless of everything

come higher than that of Argentina

democracies collapsed, countries

in 1975: $6,055.15 Thirty-two and not one

incomes above $6,055 years with spent out of democracies while sixty-nine thirty-nine that were poorer. 736

did

fall

in

survives increases 1 shows, the probability that democracy In countries with per capita with per capita income.16

As Table monotonically

income under $1,000, the probability that a democracy would die dur

ing was

a

life year was 0.125, which implies that their expected was this Between and $2,000, $1,001 probability years.17

particular

eight of about duration for an expected 0.0571, years. Above eighteen could expect to last forever. Statistical $6,055, democracies analysis, the

results of which

are shown inTable 2 (column 1), confirms that per

is a good predictor of the stability of democracies. capita an out himself for These cry thought Lipset explanation. findings is that wealth survive in affluent countries that the reason democracies income

moderates is a plausible

in various ways explanation

the intensity but not easy

of distributional to prove

conflicts.

This

The

intu

rigorously.18

itive story is this: Suppose that the political forces competing over the

14 An analogy may be useful. Suppose that someone runs the risk of 0.01 of dying from accidental at the age of seventy-eight causes she gets hit by a falling brick. To during each year of her life and that is to conclude that she died of old age. attribute this death to development 15 The claim about the prewar period is based on rather heroic backward extrapolation of 1950 in lower: we guess fell in Europe were an order of magnitude comes, but the levels at which democracies in 1933, and in 1930, $1,474 in it to have been $1,825 inAustria in 1934, $1,974 in Finland $1,814 in Italy in 1922. 16 and Keith T. Poole, "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive John B. Londregan and Poole found a similar pattern with regard to Power," World Politics 42 (January 1990). Londregan times more 1950 and 1982 coups were twenty-one coups. In their sample of 121 countries between to occur wealthiest countries. than the the among among poorest likely 17 life in any state is the inverse of the probability of transition away from this state. 18Expected at the Survive in Affluent Countries?" Adam Przeworski, (Paper presented "Why Democracies annual meeting

1996).

of the American

Political

Science Association,

San Francisco, August

28-September

1,

WORLD POLITICS

166 of income

distribution democratic share

of

choose

in which

competition, total income,

or

the verdicts of with complying some case each can to expect get a over is which fight dictatorship,

between

risking

costly but which gives the victor all of the income. Now

suppose that

the marginal is lower at higher levels of con utility of consumption is the Thus the from for sumption. gain winning struggle dictatorship

smaller. In turn, if the production function has diminishing marginal a part of it dur in capital stock, the "catch-up" from destroying war for at lower levels of wealth. Hence, the in is faster ing dictatorship a accu countries is the value of dictator and the poor greater becoming returns

cost of countries, destroying capital stock is lower. In wealthy a income the from rather than of total all contrast, part by gain getting is smaller is slower. Hence, and the recuperation from destruction is more attractive in poorer countries. struggle for dictatorship

mulated

for ex there are always alternative One, interpretations. Obviously, a proxy for education more educated is is income that and just ample, are more to embrace democratic the ac values. But while likely people an cumulated of of the labor years of education average member measure stocks we have?does increase the force?the of educational probability of income stronger. These

of survival

of democracies

survives when

education

of level, the effect independently is controlled, and indeed it ismuch

the confirm strongly is Once established, theory. democracy the more likely that itwill survive. reason we observe the relation between observations

s

Lipset nation, The

and the incidence to survive

once

democracy

of a

well-to-do

levels of development are almost certain is that democracies of democracy are established in countries. rich True, dictator they

are less stable when

ships But what

version

exogenous the more

they

reach

the pattern we generates is terribly fragile in poor

the per capita income of $4,000. 1 is that while observe in Figure countries,

it is impregnable

in the

rich ones. The probability that a democracy will die during any partic an income above ular year in a country with two in a thousand since at such years. And

zero: is practically $4,000 die at levels dictatorships that independently of the

one would percent, expect in the long run democracies initial distribution, in such wealthy countries.19 percent of regimes the rate of 5.7

torships

died

at a double,

triple,

or whatever

would Even times

constitute if wealthy

higher

96.1 dicta

rate, that

is,

* 19 where p stands for tran In the long run the proportion of democracies equals p^/ PDA)> (p^ 2. The sition probabilities, A for dictatorship and D for democracy. See Appendix ("authoritarianism"), numbers in the text are derived from Table 1.

MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS even

to much more democracy likely, is 3.9 percent. could make to believe that economic develop

if development made transitions all the difference endogenous theory there are no grounds To conclude,

ment

breeds

democracies:

Lipset's

167

"optimistic

equation,"

as O'Donnell

dubs it,20 the "benign line" in the language of Huntington

and Nel

it and those that do scatter along are democracies established, likely to survive in ones. wealthy

son,21 has few countries running In turn, once random directions. and certain die in poor countries

in to

II.Ups or Downs? to irony Lipset why democracies

s

cited several theory. While Lipset and factors Olson22 survive, anticipating explain were more to be he that democracies likely thought Huntington,23 s view, this threat to countries grew rapidly. In when destabilized Lipset and com democracy originated with "extremist movements"?fascism was a as he saw it, extremism of rapid de munism?because, product occurred "Wherever industrialization velopment. rapidly, introducing

There

is yet another to

between the pre-industrial sharp discontinuities more rather than less extremist working-class Here

and company

Lipset

could

not have

and industrial movements been more

situation,

emerged."24 wrong.

Rapid

growth is not destabilizing for democracy (and neither is it for dicta at in incomes, face a decline they die can to when but be expected last nineteen and years, an comes are at the rate of 0.0160, with die expected they growing, democracies that of sixty-four grow slowly, at years.25 Moreover, torship). When rate of 0.0523

democracies

the in life the

rate of less than 5 percent per annum, die at the rate of 0.0173, while those that grow at a rate faster than 5 percent die at the rate of 0.0132.

(SeeTable 5.) ismost

What

striking is how fragile crises. In poor countries,

of economic

poor democracies those with per

are in the face capita

income

under $2,000, of the 107 years during which a decline of incomes oc curred,

twelve

democracy

democracies

under

such

fell

the following is about

conditions

life of year: the expected nine years. Even among

20O,Donnell(fn.7),4. 21 inDeveloping and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation Samuel P. Huntington Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976) 19. 22 as aDestabilizing Mancur Olson Jr., "Rapid Growth Voice? Journal ofEconomic History 23 (De cember 1963). 23 (fn. 13). 24Huntington 54. (fn. 1,1981), 25Lipset and Poole (fn. 16) with regard to coups, This finding parallels again the results of Londregan which they found to be less likely when the economy grows.

Observed

Rates

Table 5 of Transitions, by Lagged Rate of Economic Lagged All

Growth

Level

0-1000

1001-2000

2001-3000

3001-4000

4001-5000

5001-6000

6001-7000

7001

Total

PJK

TOT

PAD

15

987 420 567

0.66 1.01 0.39

972 299 673

Total

1.52 2.14

9

G> 0

1.06

6

3.29

32

G<=0

Total

4.68

14

G> 0

2.67

18 15

TRD

6 4 2

915 397 518

12.50 21.74

23

8.16

49

2.48 3.26 2.15

18 7 11

727 215 512

5.71

8 3 5

290 80 210

3

186

3.33

1

52

4.88

2

134

4.55

245 84 161

7 3 4

184 41 143

2.75

5 2 3

150 41 109

1.87

2

107 22 85

4.35

3.16

474 121

2.76

6

G> 0

2.55

9

353

2.38

Total

2.38

8 3 5

336 93 243

1.61 1.92 1.49

229 54 175

4.92 6.25 4.44

122 32 90

191 35 156

6.41 10.53 5.08

78 19 59

0.88

0.83

2.06

Total

3.49

G<=0

5.56

G> 0

2.86

Total

3.14

G<=0

5.71

G> 0

2.56

Total

1.96

G<=0

8.82

G> 0

0.00

Total

0.15

G<=0

0.00

G> 0

0.19

Total

2.21

G<=0

3.43

G>0

1.70

a Since per capita income are used: abbreviations

88 40 48

is lagged, we

3.75

PDA is the probability TRA is their number TD is the total number

7.32 2.80

1.18

113 16 97

0.00 1.03

2

32

2

5

0

27

0.00

0

121 29 92

649 110 539

3.33 0.00 3.70

1 0 1

30 3 27

0.00 0.00

0 0

619 107

0.00

0

512

3991 1166 2825

2.06 2.61 1.78

49 21 28

2380 803 1577

2.42

39 19 20

lose 135 observations, a

of regime years at a particular of transition to democracy

TOT is the total number

TA is the total number

3.80

153 6.25 34 40.00 119 0.00

that either regime dies during PJK is the probability TTR is the number of transitions PAD is the probability TRD is their number

72

14 7 7

8.33

4.96

G> 0

TD

PDA

Total

3.23

TRA

TA

G<=0

G<=0

and

Democracies

Dictatorships

TTR

G<=0

Income

Per Capita Growth3

of years under authoritarianism of transition to authoritarianism of years under democracy

5.23 1.60

for the total of 3991. The

particular level

3.44

year

1611 363 1248

following

MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS

169

countries with incomes between $2,001 and $6,000, a decline of in comes resulted in the fall of six democracies in 120 years during which to last 20 years. And could expect this happened: these democracies a occurs: in miracle above the 252 $6,055 then, years during which economic democracies crises, none ever fell. wealthy experienced is that the political effects Another striking feature of these patterns crises are immediate:

occur one year later.We tried to they over a into 5 longer period and taking growth reproduce more we did statistical than one year. (survival) analyses lagging growth one year of Both show that past does not matter: procedures growth to economic crisis is enough effects. the produce political of economic

Table

Thus the hypothesis that rapid growth destabilizes regimes is simply it is true that "economic In turn, to cite Diamond and Linz, crisis common one of the most to democratic threats represents stability."26 are economic What destabilizes crises, and democracies, par regimes false.

ticularly

poor

are

democracies,

vulnerable

extremely

to bad

economic

performance.

III. Kinks: Modernization While ences

there are important between

theoretical

Huntington

Theory and even

and O'Donnell,

both

Revisited sharper political differ a argued that there is

level beyond which further development decreases the probability that that both regimes be will survive. Huntington contended democracy occurs a country come unstable when which modernization, undergoes at some in levels of development. intermediate turn, O'Donnell, a country exhausts "the easy tend to die when claimed that democracies stage of import

substitution," was concerned

Huntington were whether they distinction political form

of government

democratic

at some intermediate level. again with stability of regimes and did not care or authoritarian. "The most important

countries," among but their degree

he

not

their

Hence,

the

told us, "concerns

of government."27

United States, theUnited Kingdom, and the Soviet Union were all sys tems in which it is the "the government governs." Whether politburo, he insisted, little. "The problem," the cabinet, or the president matters "was not to hold elections but to create organizations." Indeed, we were

told, "The primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legiti 26 in Latin Amer and Juan J. Linz. "Introduction: Politics, Society, and Democracy Larry Diamond Countries: Latin Amer ica," in L. Diamond, J. J. Linz, and S.M. Lipset, eds., Democracy inDeveloping ica (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 17. 27 (fn. 13), 1. Huntington

WORLD POLITICS

170

never to While public order."28 explicitly referring Lipset, Hunt some of the tendencies encom "in that observed ington actuality, only in the concept of the modernization' characterized political ed areas. Instead a trend toward of and modernizing' competitiveness was an erosion of a to auto there and democracy, democracy' tendency cratic military and of Instead , one-party regimes regimes. stability there were repeated coups and revolts."29

mate

raked Lipset through the coals

Anticipating Huntington, O'Donnell for various in retrospect,

methodological he observed

nant?testimony

of a debate that in 1971 had recently begun and today

it is no

is finished: series

on his criticisms transgressions. Reflecting rem that "Chapter I is now an archeological

of data

longer necessary to demonstrate that

not foster

to lead the reader 'socio-economic

and/or

through

tedious

development' "30 What the data

does

show, 'democracy stability.' political is that in contemporary South America, the higher asserted, are associated with non-demo and the lower levels of modernization are found at inter democracies cratic political while systems, political at least within the range mediate levels of modernization." Hence, we should observe fall as that democracies observed by O'Donnell, O'Donnell

economies Is there

develop. some level of development

more likely to die than before? Note that the function

relating

beyond

which

democracies

are

(returning toTable 2, column 5)

the equilibrium

proportion

to

of democracies

per capita income has a kink at levels between $3,001 and $4,000: the observed

values

are 42.4

percent

between

$2,001

and $3,000,32.6

per

cent between $3,001 and $4,000, and 72.0 percent between $4,001 and $5,000. But this kink is due to the fact that dictatorships ally stable in this range, rather than that democracies

are exception are less stable.

The probability of a democracy dying declines monotonically with per did find a countercase O'Donnell capita income. While his of the rise of bureaucratic authoritarianism

against Lipset, is not a com

studied a country that turns out to be a dis peting theory.31 O'Donnell a tant outlier: is the only country where fell at an democracy Argentina income above $6,000; Argentina is also the only country where one col at an income between two democra and $6,000. Only $5,000 lapsed 28 29

Ibid., 7. Ibid., 35-36.

30 Studies in South American Politics, 2d and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: O'Donnell, Modernization ed. (Berkeley: Institute of International of California, 1979), 204. Studies, University 31 was careful about not was to O'Donnell making general claims: his purpose explain the downfall of democracies in the Southern Cone. But his theory of "bureaucratic authoritarianism" captured the imagination of scholars around the world, who treated it as applicable almost everywhere.

MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS

171

cies fell in countries with incomes between $4,000 and $5,000: again one of them inArgentina, and the other inUruguay. Five democracies fell between $3,000 and $4,000: one of them inArgentina. Indeed, only five democracies

outside Argentina,

fell in countries

with

incomes

above $3,000: in Uruguay in 1973 at $4,034, Suriname in 1980 at $3,923, Chile in 1973 at $3,957, Fiji in 1987 at $3,398, and Greece in 1967 at $3,176. Thus, Lipset was right in thinking that the richer the the more

country

likely

it is to sustain

IV.Does History

democracy,

Repeat

except

inArgentina.

Itself?

came in 1950, the regimes we observed or the en of two effects: their dynamic into being or at least into our trance of new countries into the world, sample. inde in our sample that were countries the seventy-three Consider of them had democratic in 1950, when regimes. By thirty-five pendent to increased these countries of democracies 1960 the number among was still in to fall to 1968. It thirty-one by only thirty-one thirty-nine, Since

our observations

begin as a result of either

1978, afterwhich

it climbed, back to thirty-nine in 1984 and to forty

our count to the "old" countries, with regard by 1990. Hence, to which oceanic with analysis, according Huntingtons32 roughly agrees

eight

(1) the "secondwave" of democratization began in 1943 and ended in 1962, (2) the "second reversewave" started in 1958 and ended in 1975, and (3) the "thirdwave" of democratization began in 1974. But the story of the countries

that became

independent

after

1950

is entirely

different. Three out of twenty-five (12.0 percent) newly independent countries seven

were

democracies

out of forty-two

(14.3

in 1960; percent)

the numbers were subsequently, in 1968, eleven out of fifty-five

(16.6 percent) in 1978, and twelve out of sixty-eight in 1990 (17.6 per

of democracies the proportion among these "new" coun cent). Hence, or up. In turn, the no waves tries grew slightly with rolling down in the world during of democracies of the aggregate decline proportion new rather than countries of the 1960s is largely due to the emergence to transformations of old ones.

Since observations of any limited period of time combine dynamic contro and entry effects, the question whether repeats itself is history tradition assume it does: they infer the his in the versial. Studies Lipset observations. from cross-sectional of "modernization" torical process 32 in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: The Third Wave: Democratization Samuel P. Huntington, considered 74 countries while our sample cov of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 16. Huntington University ers 135 countries; hence, the data are not exacdy comparable.

WORLD POLITICS

172 Followers claiming not to be

of Moore33 that

contest

theWestern

repeated. Cross-sectional

the validity of such inferences, however, was route to democracy unique, European

observations

can be used

to infer historical

processes on some ex that regimes survive or die conditional are the same across (in our case per capita income) cross sections, so that the a country has a par different that probability on the realized values of these ticular regime at any time depends only or the time when the rather than the period, the region, variables, if the probabilities variables ogenous

country became independent. And we know that (1) the probability that a democracy is born iswidely scattered with regard to the level of development, rising at low levels and declining at high levels; (2) the probability that a democracy dies declines monotonically with per capita the probability that a country has a demo these level. The question, then, iswhether were the same in different or conditional regions. probabilities periods about the validity of inferences The based on cross-sec controversy can be formulated in a number tional observations of alternative ways:

income; and cratic regime

(3) as a result, increases with

(1)Were these probabilities different beforeWorld War II inWestern Europe and elsewhere? (2)Were they different during the postwar pe countries and that existed before 1950 ("old" countries) among later that became ("new" countries)? independent we can a full set of data for the prewar Without period, only make to economic with the first data for guesses regard question. Although riod

those

with after the prewar period are not comparable those at our disposal we to guess the made heroic assumptions levels at 1950, approximate which democracies were established and fell in some of the present OECD are inTable 6. countries. The results of these calculations presented are not that these the democracies that existed however, Note, only as as War II. Southern well before World several Latin European American while

countries

in Eastern

experienced relatively long spells of democracy, most of the democratic regimes that emerged Europe

in the aftermath ofWorld War I collapsed after the first election.34And must have been at the and Uruguay relatively wealthy Argentina in income Latin Amer of the the average per capita century, beginning in 1913 ica was about one-half of that of the present OECD countries

while

and

in 1950,

while

the average

income

in Eastern

Europe

was

only

33 and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965). Jr., Social Origins ofDictatorship Barrington Moore 34 in office between parties occurred is Czechoslovakia, The exception but note that no alternation in the history of Eastern Eu during this period. Indeed, the first alternation resulting from elections rope occurred in Poland in 1991.

MODERNIZATION:

Approximate

THEORIES

6 Table at the Per Capita Income Time of Democratization in Some of the Present oecd Countries3 First Democratization Date

Australia (1901) Austria

Belgium Canada (1920) Denmark

Finland (1917)

Italy Norway (1905) Sweden Switzerland

United Kingdom United States

173

& FACTS

1901 1918b 1919b 1920 1901 1919 1875c 1919 1919 1884 1918 1870d 1911e 1830f

Reversal

Level

Date

Level

3733 1545 2960 3838 2213 1184 1748 1072 1920 1228 1919 2226 3016 1119

Present

none

1934

1825

none none none

1930 none 1933 1922

1974 (?) 1474 1814

none none none none none

Democracy

Date 1901 1951 1919 1920 1901 1944 1875 1949 1946 1884 1918 1870 1911 1830

Level

3733

2535 2960 3838 2213 2636 1748 2567 1708 1228 1919 2226 3016 1119

"Levels are GDP/cap expressed in 1985 USD. They are calculated by extrapolating backward the 1951 for per capita GDP expressed in 1985 PPP USD, using the index numbers for GDP and the pop in the Twentieth Century (Paris: ulation figures provided by Angus Maddison, The World Economy is dated by (1) the presence of contested elections or OECD, 1992), Appendixes I, II. Democratization on a partisan basis and (2) legislative sovereignty of the house elected by broadest suffrage ganized came later, but not to the crown or a nonelective (rather than responsibility upper chamber), whichever numbers

or For countries that became independent after 1871, dates in participation. by the extent of franchise are for the year of independence. parentheses b1920 figures were used. in to 1884, while John D. Stephens, "Democratic Transi cTherborn (fn. 8) dates democracy in Europe, 1870-1939: A Test of theMoore Thesis," American Journal of Sociol tion and Breakdown as one of consolidation. The question mark for ogy 94 (1989), refers to the period 1875-84 refers to the Vichy regime. and Stephens dBothTherborn electoral was established.

date democracy

in Switzerland

to circa 1880, when

the first national

uses 1911 to date democracy in the United Kingdom, but scholars who use universal as the criterion date it to 1918. See Dahl, suffrage Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale Press, 1989). University f in the United States ranges widely, from 1828 by Huntington The dating of democracy (fn. 32), 16, as a criterion, we date it early.Maddison to 1970 by Therborn. does Since we do not take participation not provide a figure for 1830; we interpolated the numbers using 1820 and 1840. eRobert Dahl

male

slightly higher.35All this is not much to stand on, but perhaps enough to believe that (1) the levels at which democracies emerged before World War IIwere highly scattered; (2) they did not differ between and (3) once established, and other parts of the world; Europe were more to fall in the poorer countries. democracies likely

Western

35 World Table 1.1.

Bank, World Bank Development

Report

1991

(Washington,

D.C.: World

Bank,

1991),

WORLD POLITICS

174 are on firmer

the second question.36 Compar ground answering are more "new" countries shows that democracies the and the "old" ing are more to die in brittle in the new countries while dictatorships likely We

the old ones. And, asTable 7 shows, the level of development again has powerful effects. The probabilities of a democracy falling decline dra matically with level in both groups of countries: indeed, this probabil ity is the

same

once

countries

reach

an

income

$2,000. The level among the

above

to increases with of a transition democracy probability after But among the countries that became old countries. independent are as are are as when when stable 1950, dictatorships they they wealthy in new countries with incomes above fifteen dictatorships poor. Among

$2,000, only one fell during their 185 years until 1990, in Suriname in

at $2,888, in the Seychelles, after 1990. and only one more, coun the effect of levels at which We may be confusing, however, tries were first observed and the effect of development they experienced the the new countries were much under scrutiny. And during period the old ones?which average income was $1,103?than poorer?their were an first observed. To had average income of $2,613?when they 1988

of the tran 8 the derivatives these effects, we show inTable distinguish to the entry levels and to the with sition regard separately probabilities since then.37 The effects of the entry level are about the development are more same for the two groups of countries. Democracies stable and more brittle in countries either when that were wealthier, dictatorships But the in 1950 or whenever first observed they became independent. between since the time of entry differ greatly effects of development increases much the two groups of countries. The stability of democracy 36 A

third question has also been posed: when D. A. Rustow, pointed out that the levels of develop atwhich different countries permanendy institutions vary widely, Lipset s established democratic was that the thresholds at which democracy was established were lower for the (fn. 1,1981) reder to Democracy," see Rustow, A "Transitions Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970). early democracies; war indicates at the levels at which democracies emerged before and after the rough guess comparing that levels at which democracy was established before the war must have been on the average lower. of incomes during the two periods was not the same: it is doubtful that many But the distribution countries enjoyed incomes above $4,000 before the war. Hence, we do not know how long the coun democracies. At most, we can tries that were poor at the time would have waited before becoming occurred before the war with the distrib of levels at which democratization compare the distribution inTable 6 we ution in the postwar period truncated at $4,000. If in addition to the guesses presented the two distribu also assume that incomes were lower in Eastern Europe and most of Latin America, tions will be highly similar. But that is too many guesses to take seriously. 37 to level is Pr[R?GIME(t)=DEMOC relates regimes that the function which Suppose where F stands for a normal or logistic distribution. Now sub RACY]=REG(t)=F[a+?LEVEL(t)], to get REG(t)=F{cc+?LEVEL(0)+ tract and add ?LEVEL(O) within the square brackets,

ment

?[LEVEL(t)-LEVEL(0)]}. Defining LEVEL(O) as INI andLEVEL(t)-LEVEL(0) asDEV(t), and

allowing the (cross-sectional) ment yields REG(t)= F[a+?c

effect of the initial level to differ from the (dynamic) effect of develop is the model we estimated, by dynamic probit. INI+?DDEV(t)].This

7

Table and Predicted Observed Regime Lagged Per Capita Income (level)

by Transition Probabilities, and by Groups of Countries51

PAD

PJK

TJK

TOT

0.0124

18

1448

0.0058

2543

(0.0058) 0.0359

Low-High

TRD

PDA

TRA

TD

1211

0.0464

11

237

1169

(0.1183) 0.0204

28

1374

TA

All New

Old

70

0.0275

7 42

(0.0544)

(0.0340)

-2000 0.0135

New

Old

15

0.0377

32

1111

0.0058

848

(0.0058) 0.0297

6 18

1036

0.1200

9

75

606

(0.1480) 0.0578

14

242

(0.0279)

(0.0707)

2000 0.0086

New

Old

3 38

0.0225

347

0.0054

1695

(0.0058) 0.0427

1 24

185

0.0123

2

162

563

(0.0203) 0.0124

14

1132

(0.0676) are used: aThe following abbreviations that either regime dies during PJK is the probability TTR is the number of transitions

(0.0156) a

particular

of regime years at a particular of transition to democracy

TOT is the total number PAD is the probability TRD is their number TA is the total number

level

of years under authoritarianism of transition to authoritarianism

PDA is the probability TRA is their number TD is the total number New

year

of years under democracy that did not exist in 1950

stands for countries

Old

stands for countries

Numbers

in parentheses

that existed

in 1950

are values predicted

by the dynamic

probit model.

8 Table of Transition with to the Probabilities Regard the and Initial Level Development Accumulated ("Entry") at the Means by Groups of Countries51 Evaluated

Derivatives

with Regard to Initial Level Derivative

Old

of

-0.0554

Pda

aLevel ismeasured for countries

in thousands. New

that existed

stands for countries

-0.0191

0.0112

0.0277

in 1950. Derivatives

New

-0.0966

-0.0552

0.0383

Pad

Development

Old

New

-0.0190

that did not exist in 1950. Old

are based on a dynamic

probit model;

see

stands

Appendix

2.

176 more

WORLD POLITICS with

development

in the old

in the new

than

countries.

In turn,

while development decreases slightly the probability of survival of dic to in old countries, the probability of transitions democracy tatorships as new countries declines under authoritarian rule. develop the promise that development would breed democracy Hence, proved

to be particularly futile precisely with regard to thoseThirdWorld coun tries towhich itwas supposed to offer hope. Development during the postwar period just did not have much of an impact on the collapse of an increase

dictatorships:

of per capita

income

raised the probability of dictatorship among countries.

the old countries

and lowered

at least "modernization"

But

of one

thousand

dollars

falling by only 1.12 percent

it by 1.90 percent among the new in the right direction in worked

where most countries, including long-standing dictatorships, did in the end fall. Most of the new countries, those in Eastern Europe, of them poor when the great majority just they became independent,

the old

remained

poor;

and those

few that did develop

remained

authoritarian.

V. Conclusion Whether

in the language theories perspective,

couched

the historical terministic.

In the modernization

democracy

it is secreted about; social transformations.

corollary s Moore theory, but they operate class structure of the seventeenth

or perspective were de of the origins of democracy no one does to bring theory anything and the by economic development of the modernization

Class

actors

at a distance

do move

of centuries:

in history the agrarian

the regimes coun century two or three hundred ob Przeworski39 later.38 As years this made both deterministic served, appear emphasis approaches on the the issue of democratization irrelevant when political appeared in the struggles for democ The protagonists agenda in the mid-1970s. that the fate of their countries would racy could not and did not believe tries

settle

determines

on

be determined either by current levels of development or by the distant democratization constraints, that, albeit within past. They maintained was an outcome the O'Don of actions, not just of conditions. Hence, was actors in of and couched nell-Schmitter strategies, project rather than in of deterministic conditions.40 38 and Stevens (fn. 6) go back just a few decades but the question remains: Huber, Rueschemeyer, in the 1920s cause events in the 1960s, not earlier or later? conditions would found why 39 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and theMarket: Political and Economic Reforms inEastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 40 and Philippe C Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: Guillermo O'Donnell Press, 1986). Johns Hopkins University

THEORIES

MODERNIZATION: Our

& FACTS

177

this latter approach. The emergence strongly validate is not a of economic Democ democracy development. by-product or actors is not established their goals, and racy is pursuing by political once it is estab at any level of it can be initiated Only development. findings

of

a role: the chances for the survival play of democracy is richer. Yet even the cur the country greater when to sur rent wealth ismore of a country is not decisive: democracy likely vive in a income with than less $1,000 economy per capita growing an income between that de than in a country with $1,000 and $2,000 lished

do economic

constraints

are

democ If they succeed in generating development, economically. racies can survive even in the poorest nations. de the vision of the relation between Viewed from this perspective,

clines

that dominated mood and the intellectual and democracy velopment war years appears the cold served to orient U.S. foreign policy during as exogenous, treated development strangely convoluted. While Lipset were is the inevitable his contemporaries that dictatorship persuaded a more democratic "the of claimed that Galenson price development. . . . the resources invest of from the diversion is, greater government ment to De Schweinitz argued that if the less devel consumption."41 must limit democratic "are to grow economically, they oped countries

participation in political affairs/'42And thiswas also the belief of Hunt ington The

and Dominguez: interest

of

the voters a

sonal

consumption a nondemocratic

higher

system.

to leads parties the give vis-?-vis investment than priority In the Soviet Union, for instance, generally

expansion itwould the

of per in receive of

percentage

GDP devoted to consumption was driven down from 65 percent in 1928 to 52 percent tained

in 1937. a revolution

It is unlikely from above

that like

a

competitive this.43

party

system

would

have

sus

are needed to generate and As Huntington development. Dictatorships tem at must least be held Nelson "Political down, put it, participation economic in order to promote development.,,44 porarily, while devel in this view dictatorships Since generate development was to to to be a said the best leads way democracy opment democracy, circuitous 41 Walter

one. Yet

common

sense would

indicate

that

in order

to

to Galenson, "Introduction" (New York: ed., Labor and Economic Development Galenson, 1959), 3. Wiley, 42 Labor Controls and Democracy," Economic Development Karl de Schweinitzjr., Industrialization, and Cultural Change 7 (July 1959). 43 in F. I. Greenstein and "Political Development," and Jorge I. Dominguez, Samuel P. Huntington Political Science, vol. 3 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, N. W. Polsby, eds., Handbook 1975), 60. of 44 and Nelson (fn. 21), 23. Huntington

WORLD POLITICS

178

we should not democracy, democracy strengthen even that "common if G. B. Shaw warned And, dictatorships. strengthen

that

it is the best

time

this

in poor

flourish

is flat," the lesson of our analysis is

tells us that the world

that which

guide. With

can

democracy

development,

countries.

1:Classifying

Appendix

Political

Regimes45

some is a regime inwhich governmental Democracy a consequence of contested elections. This definition fices"

sense is

offices

are filled as

has two parts: "of

and "contestation."

In no regime elections. What

as a consequence as democratic a regime

are all offices governmental to is essential considering

filled

of is

that two kinds of offices are filled by elections, whether directly or in the chief directly: tive body. Contestation chance

executive

and the seats

in the effective

legisla

that has some there exists an opposition as a consequence in of elections. Whenever as democracies in incum which only those systems them. did lose actually occurs when

of winning we classify

doubt, bent parties

office

office

a was classified as a if none of the democracy regime Operationally, as a dicta was classified a four rules listed below applied. Thus, regime at least one of these conditions held. torship if 1. Executive

Rule

the chief

selection:

is not

executive

elected.

Rule 2. Legislative selection: the legislature is not elected. Rule 3. Party: there is no more than one party. Specifically, this rule applies if (1) there were tenure in office

or

no

parties, ended up

(2)

there

(4) the incumbents unconstitutionally in their

rules

4.

Rule

Type

was

in the establishment

one or (3) the party, only or of a nonparty one-party

current rule, or

closed the legislature and rewrote the

favor. II error:

a

es

regime

the

previous

three

rules,

the

incumbents

held office in the immediate past by virtue of elections for more than two or without they

have

and until elected, being not lost an election.

Alternation where

a

in office

today

overrides

at one

or the

time when

they

were

overthrown

the party rule. Hence, Jamaica? of the seats in the 100 percent

time held

party lost an election?was office having yet yielded subsequently legislature as democratic classified during the entire period. are the We code the regime that pre rules Our timing following. came even to at if it vailed the end of the year, 31, power on December single

45 For a full explanation

and historical

details,

see Alvarez

et al. (fn. 10).

MODERNIZATION:

THEORIES

& FACTS

179

to in 1983. Transitions arrived in Nigeria dictatorship a are etat. to democ Transitions coup d signaled by are of the time elected of dated the the gov racy inauguration newly by a democratic not of the election. In the few cases where ernment,

as, for example, authoritarianism

regime lasted sixmonths (for example, theDominican Republic in 1963) or where

several times (Bolivia in 1979), the infor changed that the same year is lost. regimes began and ended within our is and the alternatives The main difference between approach rather than a polychotomous that we use a dichotomous classification, are more some than democratic that while scale. We believe regimes

mation

the situation

about

not be considered de others, unless offices are contested, they should mea mocratic. from a practical point of view, alternative Nonetheless, sures of dimensions similar results. The generate highly democracy or to what extent a is demo used to assess whether regime particular no measure seem to make the is cratic little difference.46 Our exception:

Coppedge-Reinicke47 the Bollen48

1965

scale for 1978 predicts 92 percent of our regimes,

scale predicts

85 percent,

the Gurr49

scales

of Au

tocracy and Democracy for 1950-86 tly predict 91 percent. The Gastil50 scale of political liberties, covering the period from 1972 to his scale of civil liber 93.2 percent of our classification; 1990, predicts ties predicts 91.5 percent; and the two scales tly predict 94.2 per cent of our there is no reason to think that our results regimes. Hence, are to the classification of regimes. idiosyncratic particular

Appendix

2: Dynamics

of Regimes

in the distinction be is entailed help elucidate what mechanisms. and exogenous endogenous has an authoritarian i= 1,...,N, that a country, Let the probability a t= the subscript 1,...,T, be pA(it), where regime during particular year, that it has a demo and the probability A stands for "authoritarian," Some

algebra may

tween

46 25 (Spring 1990), Alex Inkeless, "Introduction," Studies in Comparative International Development 3-6. Note, however, that different measures appear to be biased in somewhat different directions. See Factors in Cross-National Kenneth A. Bollen, "Liberal Democracy: Measures," Validity and Method American Journal of Political Science 37 (November 1993). 47 and Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Michael "Measuring Polyarchy," Studies in Comparative Coppedge 25 (Spring 1990), 51-72. International Development 48 American Sociologi of Development," and the Timing Kenneth A. Bollen, "Political Democracy cal Review 44 (August 1979), 572-87. 49 Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jaggers, andWill H. Moore, and State Power The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy, tional Development 25 (Spring 50 Gastil (fn. 4).

1990).

State: "The Transformation of theWestern since 1800," Studies in Comparative Interna

WORLD POLITICS cratic regime be pD(it) = 1 the probability that a dictator pA(it). Let ship dies from one year to another be pAD(it), so that the probability that it survives is p^iit) = 1 pAD(it). Similarly, let the probability that = 1a democracy dies be we assume for the time pDD(it). If pDA(it) 180

= are k = A,D, that these "transition being p.k, j A,D, probabilities/' over time and the same for all countries, constant then we can describe

the evolution of regimes by pD(t+D

Pdd

Pad

Po(t)

pA(t+D

Pda

Paa

PaW

The

of regimes

proportion therefore on the

that

are democracies

of democracies

next

that survived

year depends from the cur

proportion rent year, that died, that is, be of dictatorships pDD, and the proportion came democracies, same holds for The pAD. dictatorships. of regimes that, Given the transition rates, there exists a distribution disturbances. if reached, will remain stable in the absence of exogenous

These equilibrium probabilities are = Pd

Pad

+ Pda Pad

and Pda Pa

Pda Moreover, tions will

+

Pad

whatever

the

over

tend

time

initial

their propor of regimes, since the values. And equilibrium

distribution

to these

are likely to be probabilities that regimes die during any particular year fact they are low?this convergence of one type of regime will the proportion the other to decline.51 low?in

will

be monotonie; to increase

continue

that is, and of

of regimes depends distribution time es, then, the long-run on not on the relative rates at which their initial distrib they die, only As

51 is monotonie Convergence around the equilibrium.

if Pad + pDA < 1; otherwise,

the proportions

of regimes will

oscillate

MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS ution.

>

If Pad

in the long run there will

pDA, then

be more

181 democracies

than dictatorships in the world and if at the beginning the proportion was

of democracies crease over

lower

than

this proportion

pD*,

will

continually

in

time.

now that while die at some constant annual dictatorships Suppose = 0. You see never so democracies that that in rate, die, immediately pDA run a time the long all countries will be democracies. dictator Every a it sur is established, and, once it is established, ship dies, democracy on rate at vives forever. The of the which this process depends speed is inexorable. the of democracies but accumulation die, dictatorships to return

Now,

to the

are not

probabilities To keep matters

at stake, that these transition imagine but depend on the level of development. are two levels: low (L) suppose that there only issue

constant

simple,

and high (H). At the low level, both regimes have some probability of dying

that

ismore

than zero

and less than one. Now

consider

two pos

sibilities. < 1, once One is that while p^L) dictatorships the threshold = that defines the high level, they are certain to die, so that p^H) 1, while

democracies

probabilities

~

die

Level = Low Pdd Pda

and while

at the same

rate at either

level. The

transition

are thus

Pad Paa the long-run

Level =High LOO Pdd 0.00 Pda proportion

of democracies

at the low level will

= + at the high ievel itwill be pD*(H) 1/(1 Pm/?Pad'PdaX < pDA), pD*(L) pD*(H). Thus, the proportion of democracies will be be pD*(L)

=

are more at the because democracies high level of development as a result of to emerge is the This likely development. endogenous? of the explanation. modernization?version higher

at But suppose alternatively that authoritarian exactly the regimes die same rate whether or so in poor countries that ones, developed p^L) = = never die once in turn democratic while they regimes pAD, pAD(H) are established so that in affluent countries, transition The pDA=0.00. are then probabilities

Level = Low

Level =High

Pdd

Pad

LOO Pad

Pda

Paa

0.00

Paa

WORLD

182 and we

already

that while

know

POLITICS the long-run

of democra

proportion

cies at the low levelwin be pD*(L) < 1, at the high level all countries will we will observe an in the long run. Hence, the level of development relation and the incidence aggregate are even to emerge at democracies of democracies though equally likely even if under that authoritarianism does not is, any level, development a increase the that is democratic. This country will become probability then the exogenous version.

have

a democratic

to decide

Thus,

regime between

which

mechanism

the relation between generates to need determine how the respective with the level of development. To esti

we

and democracy, development transition change probabilities we mate the impact of level on transition probabilities, a first-order data Our Markov processes; obey myia.52 on the present regime depends regimes during only are defined but not beyond. Such processes by:

on Ame rely that is, the

the previous

year,

= P(t)Rt.1, E(R=l|R.1,Rt_2,...) = where R for democracy stands for regimes, R=D and R=A for D,A the and is matrix of transition with ele P(t) dictatorship, probabilities, ments p k(t). Hence,

R = P(t) R, Taking

+

u, of both

expectations

sides yields

P(R=D

Paa

Pda

p(R,rD

p(R=0)

Pad

Pdd

p(Rt-rO)

sum of columns

where

the

k=0,l.

Hence

of the

transition

matrix,

= + p(R=l Rtl) p^top?R^-l) p^WR^O) | = = + PAAttpdVrD PDA(t)[l-p(R,rl)] = Now

Pda?

+

= ?.p.k

1, j=0,l;

=

[PAA^-PDA^?-rD

let X be the vector

of the exogenous

variables.

Assume

that

= pDA(t) F(XA ?),

= PAA(t) F[XJcc+?)], 52 Takeshi chap. 11.

Amemyia,

Advanced

Econometrics

(Cambridge:

Harvard

University

Press,

1985),

MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS

183

where F(.) is the CDF of normal distribution. Note that p.k(t) is the probability of transition from being in state j at time (t-1) to being in state k at time regime

t. Given

as the one

that whenever

a transition

installed

that became

during

occurred this year,

we

code

the

the probabil

ity of transition between (t-1) and t depends on the conditions at (t-1). Hence,

we

lag the X

p(R=l

|RJ

s.

Then =

pDA(t)

+

[pAA(t)-pDA(t)]p(Rt.1=l)

=

+

=

+

FCX,.^ FQit_?

{FtX^a+j^-FQi^pCR^l) = + FQ^aMR^l) ?Q?tJ

xt,R,?). to estimate a and /?, from which Hence, and thus pDD = 1 pDA and pAD = 1 -p^,

one can calculate all we

need

pDA and pAA, on to do is probit

This is the model we used to generate results inTables 2 and 8,with R(0) as observed. The derivatives used inTable 8 are

dPpA = dpAD =-f + fQC^?)? and [XJa ?)](a+?). dX dX