People V Lagon 75dt

PEOPLE v LAGON FACTS -On July 7 1976 a criminal action was filed with the City Court of Roxas charging Lagon with estafa for allegedly issuing a P4,232 check as payment for goods knowing she had insufficient funds. However on Dec. 2, as the trial commenced, the City Court dismissed the information on the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for estafa was beyond the court’s authority to impose. Hence this petition for review.

1974. Upon the hearing, appellants’ counsel moved for a reinvestigation of the case which was granted. Trial court postponed hearing until December 17 and 18, 1974. The fiscal filed a motion to defer the hearing until such time as the reinvestigation shall have terminated. The trial court, however, motu proprio cancelled the Dec. 17 & 18 hearing and reset the arraignment and trial to December 10 and 11, 1974. At the December 10 hearing, counsel of appellants manifested to the court that the city fiscal had set the reinvestigation on December 12, 1974 and had already sent subpoenas to the witnesses. The court nevertheless proceeded to hearing the next day, December 11. Upon appellants’ counsels insistence, the court relying on constitutional mandate of the right to a speedy trial, re-scheduled the hearing to December 13.

ISSUE WON the City Court had jurisdiction over the case HELD NO - It is settled doctrine that jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is determined by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of the criminal action and not the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged. -Under Sec 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, “municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and subprovinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the CFI to try parties charged with an offense within their respective jurisdictions, in which penalties provided do not exceed prision correccional or fines no exceeding P6,000 or both. -At the time of the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty under Art 315 of the RPC was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional it is minimum period, falling well within the jurisdiction of the City Court. But when the information was filed, PD 818 had increased the imposable penalty to prision mayor in its medium period. -The real question raised by petitioner is whether the said doctrine disregards the rule against retroactivity of penal laws. It has been repeatedly held that in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender in after trial but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the Court in which the information is filed, it is retained regardless of whether the evidence proves a lesser offense which carries a penalty that would otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of an inferior court. -In the instant case, should the information be refiled with the RTC, the court may not impose a more onerous penalty upon Lagon. Although the RTC retains subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the refiled case under PD 818, given the date of the commission of the crime (before effectivity of PD 818), the lower penalty provided in Art 315 (otherwise within the jurisdiction of the City Court) should be imposed.

On the day of the trial, counsel asked to the court to wait for the City Fiscal to appear since the Fiscal might be able to report on the reinvestigation. However, the court insisted on arraigning the appellants. Appelants refused to give a plea because they are waiting for the fiscal, the trial court entered a plea of “Not Guilty” for each of them. Appellants counsel manifested that they could not go to trial without the City Fiscal. For the same reason, counsel refused to cross-examine the witnesses presented. Counsel reiterated that they do not agree with the trial when defense was called to present evidence. Trial court considered the case to be submitted for decision and announced promulgation of the decision on December 17.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the trial court should hold the trial until after the reinvestigation (2) Whether or not appellants were denied due process (3) Whether or not the fiscal should be present during proceedings

Held: (1) After the trial court granted the appellants’ motion for reinvestigation, it became incumbent upon the court to hold in abeyance the arraignment and trial of the case until the City Fiscal shall have conducted and made his report on the result of such reinvestigation. (2) When the trial court ignored the appellants’ manifestations objecting to the arraignment and trial of the case, it committed a serious irregularity which nullifies the proceedings because such procedure is repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution.

People v. Beriales

(3) Although fiscal turns over active conduct of trial to private prosecutor, he should be present during the proceedings. While there is nothing in the rule of practice and procedure in criminal cases which denies the right of the fiscal to turn over the active conduct of the trial to a private prosecutor, nevertheless, his duty to direct and control the prosecution of criminal cases requires that he must be present during the proceeding.

Facts: Ricardo Beriales, Benedicto Custodio and Pablito Custodio were convicted of the crime of murder by CFI of Leyte. They have allegedly murdered one Saturnina Gonzales Porcadilla on September 14,

REPUBLIC vs. SUNGA June 20, 1988

Dispositive WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the petition.

FACTS: An information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur against accused-private respondents Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. Ahearing was set but was postponed since Rafael Anadilla was not yet arrested by the authorities. The court a quo issued an order for the arrest of said accused, and at the same time set a new trial date. However, 4 months before the trial date, the court a quo issued the now assailed order which reads: ³Considering that the offended party, Jose Dadis is no longer interested in the further prosecution of this case and there being no objection on the part of the accused Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, this case is hereby DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

The rule is that once a complaint is filed, the disposition of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court. The fiscal cannot impose his opinion on the court when the case has been submitted to it as his jurisdiction ends in the direction and control of the prosecution of the case. Only the court can decide what the best direction is for the case, as it is within its exclusive jurisdiction. In this case, almost 10 years have elapsed since the date of the filing of the information, hence it was not unusual that the victim could not find his witnesses, the testimonies of whom are needed to convict the accused. The fiscal still believed that he could convict the accused without thee testimonies in his MR! Although the Crespo doctrine holds that it is the courts duty to judge whether a case should be dismissed, any move of the offended part to dismiss the case, even without objection of the accused, should first be submitted to the fiscal. It is only after the fiscal’s hearing that the court should exercise its duty to continue or dismiss the case.

Consequently, the order of arrest issued by this Court against the accused Rafael Anadilla dated March 11, 1974, is hereby ordered lifted and has no force and effect. The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled.

Petition dismissed.

In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, the Provincial Warden is hereby ordered to release said accused from their detention immediately upon receipt of this order.

FACTS: Accused-appellant Dick Ocapan and Joselyn Ocapan, the woman who lived with him in an ostensible marital relationship, were charged on March 11, 1985 before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte at Iligan City with the complex crime of rape with serious illegal detention.

PEOPLE VS. OCAPAN

SO ORDERED.³ The order was based on an AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE which was executed and notarized by the victim and mentioned that: a. he was no longer interested in the further prosecution of the case b. he had forgiven the accused c. his material witnesses could not be located, and that without their testimonies, the guilt of the accused could not be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The provincial fiscal moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, but was also denied. Hence the petition and issue of the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party, but without a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal. RATIO: The court cites a similar case Crespo v. Mogul in its when it answered that the filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court.

The case against Joselyn Ocapan was dismissed while Dick Ocapan was convicted and sentenced accordingly for the crime of serious illegal detention. The decision of the trial court was appealed to the Court of Appeals which elevated its decision to this Court for final determination in accordance with Section 13 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. INFORMATION: 'That on or about January 17, 1985, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Dick Ocapan conspiring and confederating with his common-law wife, Joselyn O. Ocapan, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge with one Arlene Yupo, a minor and who was working as househelper, of the said accused; that thereafter, in order to prevent the said Arlene Yupo from reporting to the proper authorities, detained and deprived her of her liberty for more than five (5) days.' "On October 7, 1985 the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the rape charge on the ground that the offended party had not filed a complaint, but finding the accused- appellant guilty of serious illegal detention. - Prosecution failed to present a signed complaint of the offended party. ISSUE: WON the TC did not acquire jurisdiction as the offended party did not file a complaint (of rape) for this crime. NO JURISDICTION, correctly dismissed by the TC. RATIO: VALDEPENAS VS. PEOPLE: the filing of a complaint for rape or for any other offense enumerated in Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code by the person or persons mentioned therein is jurisdictional.

PEOPLE VS. ILARDE

FACTS: INFORMATION: "That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1980, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused Cecile Santibañez being lawfully married to Efraim Santibañez, which marriage at that time has not been legally dissolved, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, maliciously and criminally have sexual intercourse with her co-accused Avelino T. Javellana, a man not her husband and who in turn knowing fully well that his co-accused was then lawfully married to Efraim Santibañez, did then and there wilfully, maliciously and criminally have sexual intercourse with her.

2) The strong and equivocal statement contained in the affidavit filed with the Fiscal's Office that "I am formally charging my wife Cecile Sorianosos and Atty. Bob Javellana of the crime of adultery and would request that this affidavit be considered as a formal complaint against them" [Annex 'B' supra]; 3) His filing of a complaint for legal separation against Cecile Santibañez with the local Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court; and finally, 4) In disinheriting his wife in his Last Will and Testament dated January 10, 1981.

Sometime in January 1981, i.e., before the conclusion of the preliminary investigation then being conducted by the Fiscal's Office, Efraim Santibañez learned that he was sick of cancer and decided to leave for the United States for medical treatment. Before his departure, he executed a holographic will, dated January 10, 1981, a portion of which provided: "I do hereby disinherit my second wife Cecilia Sorianosos of any and all inheritance she is entitled under the law as my wife on the ground that she had given cause for legal separation by committing acts of adultery with Atty. Bob Javellana in the evening of November 3, 1980 in my conjugal abode at Candido Subdivision and as a result of which I charged her and Atty. Bob Javellana for adultery with the Fiscal's Office and I filed a case of legal separation against her in Civil Case No. SP-11-309 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Iloilo City for which act of infidelity, I can never forgive her." On January 15, 1981, after several requests for postponement, private respondents submitted their memorandum to the Fiscal's Office; and on February 19, 1981, Fiscal Galvez issued a resolution finding the existence of a prima facie case for adultery against private respondents. On February 26, 1981, Fiscal Galvez was informed by relatives of Efraim Santibañez that the latter had died in the United States on February 16, 1981. This notwithstanding, he prepared the information in question on March 3, 1981, and on the following day, filed the same with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. Private respondents filed a MOTION TO QUASH the information on the ground that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the offense charged, as the offended party had not filed the required complaint pursuant to the provisions of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "the crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse." Respondent judge: GRANTED the motion and DISMISSED the case. ISSUE: WON there has been compliance with the requirement of ART. 344 of the RPC, reiterated in Sec. 4, Rule 110 of the ROC, that “the crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint by the offended party.” THERE HAS BEEN COMPLIANCE. RATIO: the law leaves it to the option of the aggrieved spouse to seek judicial redress for the affront committed by the erring spouse.

PEOPLE VS. SANTOS The “salaysay” was a mere narration of how the crime of rape was committed against her.

The information filed by Rizal Provincial Fiscal commenced with the statement ;the undersigned fiscal accuses Santos with the crime of rape,’ the offended party NOT having been mentioned at all as one of the accs.

CASE AT BAR The latter not only narrated the facts and circumstances constituting the crime of adultery, but he also explicitly and categorically charged private respondents with the said offense. "The undersigned city fiscal upon sworn statement originally filed by the offended party Efraim Santibañez, xerox copies of which are hereto attach as Annexes 'A' and 'B' . . ."

REASONS THE COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT IS A VALID COMPLAINT: it contains all the allegations required of a criminal complaint. 1) States the names of the defendants, the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or omission complained of as constituting the offense. 2) The name of the offended party, the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place where the offense was committed. 3) Said complaint-affidavit was attached to the information as an integral part thereof, and duly filed with the court. People vs. Madali Facts:

In the case at bar, the desire of the offended party, Efraim Santibañez, to bring his wife and his alleged paramour to justice is only too evident. 1) Such determination of purpose on his part is amply demonstrated in the dispatch by which he filed his complaint with the police [annex 'A', supra];

• An appeal from the decision of the RTC Branch 81 of Romblon, Romblon finding accused-appellants guilty of the murder of Reynaldo M. Abrenica and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua. The body of Reynaldo was found by his wife on the landing of the stairs of their house. An autopsy conducted by Dr. Villaseñor of the PNP Crime Laboratory yielded to the conclusion that the cause of death is intracranial hemorrhage as a result of traumatic head injury.

• Three years after Reynaldo’s death, the case was filed after an alleged eyewitness, Mercy Villamor, surfaced and implicated the accused-appellants. Based on the testimony of this witness, the accusedappellants were found guilty in the aforementioned decision.

- On May 15 1978, a decision was made by the CA granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Dept of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.

• The accused-appellants, in their appeal, alleged that the trial court erred in failing to resolve doubts and discrepancies in its findings of fact in favor of the accused and that the court erred in finding credible the testimonies of Mercy Villamor and Dr. Villaseñor.

- On March 22, 1978, The Undersecretary of Justice Hon Catalino Macaraig Jr, resolving the petition for review, reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. The Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence on April 10, 1978. On November 24 1978, The Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment

• The complainant filed a Motion for Time to File Brief separate from that which the OSG would file, by way of an answer to the brief of accused-appellants. This motion was denied. The OSG subsequently filed a Manifestation recommending the acquittal of accused-appellants. In view of the position taken by the OSG, complainant filed a Memorandum for the Private Complainant (after filing a Manifestation and Motion to File Brief) which was noted by the Court. Ruling and Reasoning:

- The accused filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. On January 23 1979, a restraining order was issued by the CA against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused. However, in a decision of October 25 1979, the CA dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of Jan 23,1979. The motion for reconsideration of the accused was denied in a resolution.

• Rule 122, Sec.1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that “any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.” It has been held that the word “party” in the provision includes not only the government and the accused but other persons who may be affected by the judgment.

ISSUE WON the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits

• The complainant has an interest in the civil liability arising from the crime. Hence, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant’s role is that of a witness for the prosecution.

HELD YES

• Ordinarily, the appeal of the criminal cases involves as parties only the accused, as appellants, and the State, represented by the SolGen, as the appellee. The participation of the private offended party would be a mere surplusage if the State were simply to seek affirmation of a judgment of conviction. However, where the OSG takes a contrary position and recommends, as in this case, the acquittal of the accused, the complainant’s right to be heard as regards indemnity and damages arises.

Ratio Once an information is filed in court, the court’s prior permission must be secured if fiscal wants to reinvestigate the case. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court, whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should\ be addressed for the consideration of the Court.

• Nevertheless, the evidence is insufficient to sustain the accused-appellants’ conviction. Mercy Villamor’s testimony is riddled with inconsistencies, improbabilities and uncertainties which relate to material points. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must itself be credible.

DISPOSITION Petition dismissed Paul G. Roberts, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996 DECISION

Crespo vs. Mogul - Assistant Fiscal Proceso de Gala filed an information for estafa against Mario Crespo in Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. The presiding judge (leodegario Mogul) denied the motion through his order. - The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction. In an order (Aug 17 1977), the CA restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court

DAVIDE, JR., J.: I.

THE FACTS

Petitioners, who are corporate officers and of the Board of Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. were prosecuted in connection with the Pepsi “Number Fever” promotion by handlers of the supposedly winning “349” Pepsi crowns. Of the four cases filed against the petitioners, probable cause was found by the investigating prosecutor only for the crime of estafa, but not for the other alleged offenses. On 12 April 1993, the information was filed with the trial court without anything accompanying it. A copy of the investigating prosecutor’s t Resolution was forwarded to and received by the trial court

only on 22 April 1993. However, no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were found in the records of the case as of 19 May 1993. On 15 April 1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to the Department of Justice seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor. They also moved for the suspension of the proceedings and the holding in abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Meanwhile, the public prosecutor also moved to defer the arraignment of the accusedappellants pending the final disposition of the appeal to the Department of Justice. On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1) denying, on the basis of Crespovs. Mogul, the foregoing motions respectively filed by the petitioners and the public prosecutor, and directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest “after June 1993” and setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993. In part, respondent judge stated in his order that since the case is already pending in this Court for trial, following whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity his court. To justify his order, he quoted the ruling of the Supreme Court in Crespo, which stated: In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the respondent judge had not the slightest basis at all for determining probable cause when he ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest. After finding that a copy of the public prosecutor’s t Resolution had in fact been forwarded to, and received by, the trial court on 22 April 1993, the CA denied petitioners’ application for writ of preliminary injunction. The CA ruled that the t Resolution “was sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by respondent Judge in convincing himself that probable cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest” and that the “mere silence of the records or the absence of any express declaration” in the questioned order as to the basis of such finding does not give rise to an adverse inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty. Roberts, et al. sought reconsideration, but meanwhile, the DOJ affirmed the finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the petition for mootness.

warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have been resolved. There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, “as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court.” Whether the DOJ would affirm or reverse the challenged t Resolution is still a matter of guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to deny the motions to suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following grounds: This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity of this Court. This Court is still capable of istering justice. The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing of the aforementioned motions [to suspend proceedings and issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment] at that stage but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for review reversing the t Resolution of the investigating prosecutor. However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative. PEOPLE VS. GUEVARRA

II. THE ISSUE

FACTS: In an Amended Information, Jaime Guevarra y Arcega, Poncing Abergas, Dan Tolentino, Baldo de Jesus, Roming Longhair, Boy Tae, Boy Pogi, Vergel Bustamante alias "Dan Saksak", and Chotse Doe alias Bernabe Sulaybar y Hernandez were accused of the crime of Kidnapping of Priscilla P. Cruz. After a separate trial for Poncing Abergas and Vergel Bustamante alias "Dan Saksak," inasmuch as Dan Tolentino, who had previously entered of plea of "not guilty" could not be served with subpoenas, and the other accused were reported to have died, judgment was rendered * finding the accused Vergel Bustamante alias "Dan Saksak" guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention and sentenced to suffer the death penalty, and to indemnify the offended party, Mrs. Priscilla Cruz, in the amount of P5,000.00. The accused Poncing Abergas, upon the other hand, was acquitted of the charge. Counsel for the defendant-appellant, in this appeal, contends that the trial court erred in ordering the amendment of the information to include, as party defendant, Vergel Bustamante alias "Dan Saksak" despite lack of proof that Vergel Bustamante and "Dan Saksak" are one and the same person.

1. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have been resolved?

ISSUE: WON the oder of the TC to amend the information to include the correct name of one of the accused, “Dan Salaksak,” which is Vergel Bustamante, is not without basis. WITH BASIS. - This issue was being raised for the FIRST TIME on appeal.

III. THE RULING

RATIO: The issue is one affecting jurisdiction over the person and should have been raised before the trial court in a motion to quash the information. - Since the defendant-appellant failed to do so, he is deemed to have waived his objection to the information. - It is well to note that before the case was tried in the court a quo, Atty. Romano, counsel for the defendant- appellant, told the court that he was filing a motion to quash the information for kidnapping. - But, he FAILED to file such motion. - Obviously, he was satisfied with the legality of the information filed.

[The Court, in a 7-5-2 vote, GRANTED the petition. It SET ASIDE the decision and resolution of the CA, the resolutions of the DOJ 349 Committee, and the order of respondent judge.] 1. YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of

PEOPLE v. PURISIMA (1978) DESIGNATION OF OFFENSE, SEC. 8, RULE 110 FACTS OF THE CASE: There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and ed by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law. Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime. ISSUES OF THE CASE: Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? HELD: COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THERESPONDENT JUDGES.

RATIO: ON SUFFICIENCY OF THE INFORMATION: for a complaint or information to be sufficient it must, inter alia, state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. It is necessary that the particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial difference between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.(PD 9 punishes the offender with 5-10 yrs imprisonment; Sec26, Act 1780 with a fine of P500 or by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or both; Ordinance 3820 with a fine of not more than P200 or imprisonment for not more than 1 month or both). But since it was specified in the Information that the accused were charged with violation of Par3, PD 9, it was necessary for the Court to elucidate the elements of the said PD to differentiate it from other statutes. PEOPLE VS. BUAYABAN No such offense as robbery in band with homicide. FACTS: At about 7:00 p.m. on January 2, 1990, at Barangay Maihao, Cawayan, Masbate, accused Paulino Buayaban, Larry Betache, Marciano Toñacao, Yoyong Buayaban and Pedro Tumulak, all armed, entered the house of Dioscoro Abonales. Pedro Tumulak and Paulino Buayaban immediately poked their guns at Rolando Verdida who was sitting near the balcony with his fiancee Elizabeth Abonales, the daughter of Dioscoro. They were ordered to lie flat on the floor. Marciano Toñacao and Yoyong Buayaban then proceeded to the room where Dioscoro was sleeping. Yoyong kicked Dioscoro in the face and when the latter stood up, Marciano shot him in the neck. Dioscoro died instantly. Meanwhile, Larry Betache went outside the house and stood guard at the door holding a knife. Pedro then went to the kitchen, grabbed the right arm of Josefa Abonales, wife of Dioscoro, and asked her where the money was. Frightened, Josefa quickly went to the room, followed by Marciano while Pedro returned to where Elizabeth and Rolando were lying down in order to watch over them. Marciano threatened Josefa

with death if she refused to surrender the money. Josefa took the money amounting to P30,000 from the wooden chest, placed it inside a pillow case and she handed it to Marciano. The money was the family's capital in the business of buying and selling pigs. In the meantime, somebody forcibly took the wallet of Rolando while he was lying face down on the floor. The wallet contained P10,000 to be used for Rolando's wedding to Elizabeth and which Rolando brought to Elizabeth's house that night because they were preparing for the wedding. Appellant, Pedro Tumulak, was found guilty by the trial court of the complex crime of robbery with homicide. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In this appeal, appellant argued that Judge Basilla, the judge who wrote the decision, was not the judge who observed firsthand the testimonies of the witnesses. Thus, Judge Basilla, not having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the witness stand, could not have discerned and gauged if said witnesses were telling the truth. ISSUE: WON the TC gravely erred in giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and totally disregarding that of the defense. NO. RATIO: The fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses was not enough reason to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses. WHY GUILTY: the positive identification of the appellant and his companions was made not only by Artemio Abonales but also by Rolando Verdida and Josefa Abonales whose testimonies were straightforward and categorical. RE: DESIGNATION OF OFFENSE: In the information, the People erroneously charged the accused with "robbery in band with homicide." - There is NO such crime in the Revised Penal Code. - The felony is properly called ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. - In the landmark case of People vs. Apduhan, Jr., we ruled that if robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be denominated as "robbery with homicide" under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, but the circumstance that it was committed by a band would be appreciated as an ordinary aggravating circumstance. - However, in the present case, we cannot treat the ordinary aggravating circumstance of band because it was not alleged in the body of the information. Though it is an ordinary aggravating circumstance, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure require that even generic aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the Information. In this case, we CANNOT properly appreciate the ordinary aggravating circumstance of band in the commission of the crime since there was no allegation. PEOPLE VS DELIM FACTS: Accused-appellants were found guilty by the trial court of the crime of murder for the killing of Modesto Delim. It was established during trial that the malefactors abducted the victim from his house. After several days, the victim was found dead by his relatives under the thick bushes in a grassy area in the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. In convicting appellants of the crime of murder, the trial court relied on circumstantial evidence. Consequently, appellants were sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. Hence, this automatic review of the case.

NFORMATION: "That on or about January 23, 1999, in the evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with short firearms barged-in and entered the house of Modesto Delim and once inside WITH INTENT TO KILL, treachery, evident premedidation (sic), conspiring with one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold, hogtie, gag with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct Modesto Delim, accused Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house guarded and prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse of superior strength stabbed and killed said Modesto Delim, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants guilty of murder.

Trinidad, Benguet for carnapping with violence of another Toyota Tamaraw FX belonging to a certain James Advincula.

ISSUE: whether the crime charged in the Information is MURDER or KIDNAPPING. MURDER.

- Hence, we agree that it was error for the trial court to sentence appellant under Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659.

RATIO: where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. - Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to act. - Specific intent involves a state of the mind. - It is the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited act. - Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent. In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely to kill him with the attendant modifying circumstances. - The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their primary purpose of killing him. - Moreover, there is no specific allegation in the information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to kidnapping. Irrefragably then, the crime charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof. PEOPLE VS. FERNANDEZ FACTS: INFORMATION: that on or about the 21st day of April 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and drive away a motor vehicle described as follows: MAKE TOYOTA SERIES TAMARAW FX TYPE OF BODY WAGON PLATE NO. AVF-723 MOTOR NO. 2C 3020507 SERIAL/CHASSIS NO. CF50 0016027 belonging to SPOUSES JEFFRED ACOP & JOSEPHINE ACOP and driven by CLIFFORD GUINGUINO y GORIO and on the occasion and by reason of said carnapping, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, the accused attacked, assaulted and shot the said Clifford Guinguino y Gorio, thereby inflicting upon the latter: Cardio Respiratory failure, Hypovolemic shock, Cardiac tamponade, Hemothorax Intra Abdominal Hemorrhage Secondary to Gunshot Wound, Multiple, which caused his death. To prove that appellant's group is a syndicate organized for carnapping activities, the prosecution adduced in evidence the information filed against appellant, Kiwas, and four other men, before the RTC of La

ISSUE: WON the TC erred in holding that Fernandez is a member of an organized group or syndicate engaged in an illegal carnapping scheme. YES, erred. RATIO: In this case, the allegation of being part of a syndicate or that appellant and companions had formed part of a group organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of a syndicated or organized crime group, was neither alleged nor proved by the prosecution.

No aggravating circumstance having been alleged or proved properly in this case, the provisions of Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code should be applied. - Without mitigating nor aggravating circumstance found in the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty for the offense, which is reclusion perpetua, should be imposed on appellant. PEOPLE VS. MASAPOL FACTS: Beatriz, a married woman, claimed that the appellant herein raped her one night while she was on her way home after buying kerosene from the store. The appellant, for his defense, itted having consensual sexual congress with Beatriz for sometime, even before the alleged rape, and denied having carnal knowledge of her on the alleged date of the rape. After the parties adduced their testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court rendered its decision finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In his appeal, the appellant contended that the testimony of Beatriz was inconsistent with her statement to the barangay captain and the prosecution failed to adduce any medical certificate to corroborate her testimony. INFORMATION: That on or about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 17, 1992, at Barangay Marangi, Municipality of San Fernando, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with lewd designs, and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with one Beatriz O. Pascuin, against her will. ISSUE: WON the special aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon such as a knife to commit a crime was alleged in the Information, as required by Sec. 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. NO. RATIO: The prosecutor proved that the appellant used a knife, a deadly weapon, in forcing Beatriz to submit to his lustful desires. - Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the use of a deadly weapon such as a knife to commit a crime is a special aggravating circumstance which requires the imposition of reclusion perpetua to death. However, such circumstance was not alleged in the Information as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. - Although the said rules took effect only on December 1, 2000, long after the commission of the crime on July 17, 1992, the same should be applied retroactively because it is favorable to the appellant. HELD: GUILTY of simple rape under ART. 335 of the RPC and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE VS. DEGAMO

At the same time, another Information 7 for grave threats, docketed as Criminal Case No. 23728, 8 was filed against respondent on March 17, 1997.

FACTS: INFORMATION: That on or about the 1st day of October 1994 at around 1:00 o'clock in the early morning, in Brgy. Punta, Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused RONETO DEGAMO alias Roy, being then armed with a bladed weapon, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant herein ELLEN VERTUDAZO, against her will and in her own house. The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused DEGAMO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape. NOTE: the complaint for rape with use of a deadly appellant to include the allegation that the victim has rape. Although the penalty for rape with the use of reclusion perpetua to death, the mandatory penalty Amended Information.

weapon was amended AFTER ARRAIGNMENT of become insane by reason or on the occasion of the a deadly weapon under the original Information is of death is imposed where the victim has become

ISSUE: WON the subject amendment is one of substance. NO, formal amendment. RATIO: Under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, an amendment after the plea of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided: (i) leave of court is obtained; and (ii) such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. - A substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had already been arraigned. IMPORTANT: the insertion of the phrase that the victim has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape in the Information merely raised the penalty that may be imposed in case of conviction and does not charge another offense different from that charged in the original Information. - Whatever defense appellant may have raised under the original information for rape committed with a deadly weapon equally applies to rape committed with a deadly weapon where the victim has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape. - The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant. - Therefore, the trial court correctly allowed the amendment. ALSO, that objection to the amendment must be seasonably made, for when the trial was had upon an information substituted for the complaint or information without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived. It cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. VILLAFLOR VS. VIVAR FACTS: An Information for slight physical injuries was filed against Respondent Dindo Vivar on February 7, 1997. The case stemmed from the alleged mauling of Petitioner Gian Paulo Villaflor by respondent around 1:00 a.m. on January 27, 1997 outside the Fat Tuesday Bar at the Ayala Alabang Town Center, Muntinlupa City. After the severe beating he took from respondent, petitioner decided to leave the premises together with a friend who was in the restroom when the mauling incident took place. On his way out, petitioner again met respondent who told him, "Sa susunod gagamitin ko na itong baril ko" ("Next time, I will use my gun on you"). When the injuries sustained by petitioner turned out to be more serious than they had appeared at first, an Information for serious physical injuries was filed against respondent. The earlier charge of slight physical injuries was withdrawn.

ISSUE: WON the filing of the Amended Information, without a new preliminary investigation, violate the rights of the respondent. NO. RATIO: The filing of the Amended Information, without a new preliminary investigation, did not violate the right of respondent to be protected from a hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution; an open and public accusation of a crime; or from the trouble, the expenses and the anxiety of a public trial. - The Amended Information could not have come as a surprise to him for the simple and obvious reason that it charged essentially the same offense as that under the original Information. - Moreover, if the original charge was related to the amended one, such that an inquiry would elicit substantially the same facts, then a new preliminary investigation was not necessary. NOTE: the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. - Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court or constitute a ground for quashing the information. - The trial court, instead of dismissing the information, should hold in abeyance the proceedings and order the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. - Hence, the RTC in this case erred when it dismissed the two criminal cases for serious physical injuries (Criminal Case No. 23787) and grave threats (Criminal Case No. 23728) on the ground that the public prosecutor had failed to conduct a preliminary investigation.