Kierkegaard - The Present Age (full Text Trans Alexander Dru)a 5y1dv

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THE PRESENT AGE

Our age is essentially one of understanding and reflection, without ion, momentarily bursting into enthusiasm, and shrewdly relapsing into repose. If we had statistical tables of the consumption of intelligence from generation to generation as we have for spirits, we should be astounded at the enormous amount of scruple and deliberation consumed by small, well-to-do families living quietly, and at the amount which the young, and even children, use. For just as the children’s crusade may be said to typify the Middle Ages, precocious children are typical of the present age. In fact one is tempted to ask whether there is a single man left ready, for once, to commit an outrageous folly. Nowadays not even a suicide kills himself in desperation. Before taking the step he deliberates so long and so care fully that he literally chokes with thought. It is even questionable whether he ought to be called a suicide, since it is really thought which takes his life. He does not die with deliberation but from deliberation. It would therefore be very difficult to prosecute the present generation in view of its legal quibbles: in fact, its ability, virtuosity and good sense consists in trying to reach a judgement and a decision without ever going as far as action. If one may say of the revolutionary period that it runs wild, one would have to say of the present that it runs badly. Between them, the individual and his generation always bring each other to a standstill, with the result that the prosecuting attorney would find it next to impossible to get any fact itted—because nothing really happens. To judge from innumerable indications, one would conclude that something quite exceptional had either just happened or was just about to happen. Yet any such conclusion would be quite wrong. Indications are, indeed, the only achievements of the age; and its skill and inventiveness in constructing fascinating illusions, its bursts of enthusiasm, using as a deceitful escape some projected change of form, must be rated as high in the scale of cleverness and of the negative use of strength as the ionate, creative energy of the revolution in the corresponding scale of energy. But the present generation, wearied by its chimerical efforts, relapses into complete indolence. Its condition is that of a man who has only fallen asleep towards morning: first of all come great dreams, then a feeling of laziness, and finally a witty or clever excuse for remaining in bed.

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However well-meaning and strong the individual man may be (if he could only use his strength), he still has not the ion to be able to tear Soren A. Kierkegaard. New York : Harper Torchbooks, 1962.

2 himself from the coils and seductive uncertainty of reflection. Nor do his surroundings supply the events or produce the general enthusiasm necessary in order to free him. Instead of coming to his help, his milieu forms around him a negative intellectual opposition, which juggles for a moment with a deceptive prospect, only to deceive him in the end by pointing to a brilliant way out of the difficulty — by showing him that the shrewdest thing of all is to do nothing. For at the bottom of the tergiversation of the present age is vis inertiae, and every one without ion congratulates himself upon being the first to discover it, and so becomes cleverer still. During the revolution arms were distributed freely, just as during the Crusades the insignia of the exploit were bestowed upon men, but nowadays people are supplied with rules of careful conduct and ready reckoners to facilitate judgement. If a generation were given the diplomatic task of postponing any action in such a way as to make it seem as if something were just about to happen, then we should have to it that our age had performed as remarkable a feat as the revolutionary age. Let any one try forgetting all he knows of the age and its actual relativity which is so enhanced by familiarity, and then arrive, as it were, from another world: if he were then to read a book or an article in the papers, or merely to speak to some er-by, his impression would be: ‘Good heavens, something is going to happen to-night — or perhaps something happened the night before last.’ A revolutionary age is an age of action; ours is the age of ment and publicity. Nothing ever happens but there is immediate publicity everywhere. In the present age a rebellion is, of all things, the most unthinkable. Such an expression of strength would seem ridiculous to the calculating intelligence of our times. On the other hand a political virtuoso might bring off a feat almost as remarkable. He might write a manifesto suggesting a general assembly at which people should decide upon a rebellion, and it would be so carefully worded that even the censor would let it . At the meeting itself he would be able to create the impression that his audience had rebelled, after which they would all go quietly home — having spent a very pleasant evening. Among the young men of today a profound and prodigious learning is almost unthinkable; they would find it ridiculous On the other hand a scientific virtuoso might draw up a subscription form outlining an all embracing system which he purposed to write and, what is more, in such a way that the reader would feel he had already read the system; for the age of encyclopaedists, when men wrote gigantic folios with unremitting pains, is gone. Now is the turn of those light-weight encyclopaedists who, en ant, deal with all the sciences and the whole of existence. Equally unthinkable among the young men of today is a truly religious renunciation of the world, adhered to with daily self-denial. On the other hand almost any theological student is capable of something far more wonderful He could found a society with the sole object of saving all those who are lost. The age of great and good actions is past, the present is the age of anticipation when even recognition is received in advance. No one is satisfied with doing something definite, every one wants to feel flattered by reflection with the illusion of having discovered at the very least a new continent. Like a young man who decides to work for his examination in all earnest from September 1st, and in order to strengthen his resolution decides to take a holiday during August, so the present

3 generation seems — though this is decidedly more difficult to understand — to have made a solemn resolution that the next generation should set to work seriously, and in order to avoid disturbing or delaying the next generation, the present attends to — the banquets. Only there is a difference: the young man understands himself in the light-heartedness of youth, whereas our generation is serious — even at banquets. There is no more action or decision in our day than there is perilous delight in swimming in shallow waters. But just as a grown-up, struggling delightedly in the waves, calls to those younger than himself: ‘Come on, jump in quickly ‘— the decision in existence, so to speak (of course it is in the individual) calls out to the young who are not as yet worn out by over reflective thought or overburdened by the illusions of reflective thought: Come on, leap cheerfully, even if it means a lighthearted leap, so long as it is decisive. If you are capable of being a man, then danger and the harsh judgement of existence on your thoughtlessness will help you to become one. If the jewel which every one desired to possess lay far out on a frozen lake where the ice was very thin, watched over by the danger of death, while, closer in, the ice was perfectly safe, then in a ionate age the crowds would applaud the courage of the man who ventured out, they would tremble for him and with him in the danger of his decisive action, they would grieve over him if he were drowned, they would make a god of him if he secured the prize. But in an age without ion, in a reflective age, it would be otherwise. People would think each other clever in agreeing that it was Unreasonable and not even worth while to venture so far out. And in this way they would transform daring and enthusiasm into a feat of skill, so as to do something, for after all ‘something must be done.’ The crowds would go out to watch from a safe place, and with the eyes of connoisseurs appraise the accomplished skater who could skate almost to the very edge (i.e. as far as the ice was still safe and the danger have not yet begun) and then turn back. The most accomplished skater would manage to go out to the furthermost point and then perform a still more dangerous looking run, so as to make the spectators hold their breath and say: ‘Ye Gods! How mad; he is risking his life.’ But look, and you will see that his skill was so astonishing that he managed to turn back just in time, while the ice was perfectly safe and there was still no danger. As at the theatre, the crowd would applaud and acclaim him, surge homeward with the heroic artist in their midst, to honour him with a magnificent banquet. For intelligence has got the upper hand to such an extent that it transforms the real task into an unreal trick and reality into a play. During the banquet iration would reach its height. Now the proper relation between the irer and the object of iration is one in which the irer is edified by the thought that he is a man like the hero, humbled by the thought that he is incapable of such great actions, yet morally encouraged to emulate him according to his powers; but where intelligence has got the upper hand the character of iration is completely altered. Even at the height of the banquet, when the applause was loudest, the iring guests would all have a shrewd notion that the action of the man who received all the honour was not really so extraordinary, and that only by chance was the gathering for him, since after all, with a little practice, every one could have done as much.

4 Briefly, instead of being strengthened in their discernment and encouraged to do good, the guests would more probably go home with an even stronger predisposition to the most dangerous, if also the most respectable, of all diseases: to ire in public what is considered unimportant in private—since everything is made into a joke. And so, stimulated by a gush of iration, they are all comfortably agreed that they might just as well ire themselves. Formerly it was agreed that a man stood or fell by his actions; nowadays, on the contrary, every one idles about and comes off brilliantly with the help of a little reflection, knowing perfectly well what ought to be done. But what two people talking together, or the speakers at a meeting, understand perfectly presented to them as a thought or as an observation, they cannot understand at all in the form of action. If-same one were to overhear what people said ought to be done, and then in a spirit of irony, and for no other reason, proceeded to act accordingly every one would be amazed. They would find it rash, yet as soon as they had talked it over they would find that it was just what should be done. The present age with its sudden enthusiasms followed by apathy and indolence is very near the comic; but those who understand the comic see quite clearly that the comic is not where the present age imagines. Now satire, if it is to do a little good and not cause immeasurable harm, must be firmly based upon a consistent ethical view of life, a natural distinction which renounces the success of the moment; otherwise the cure will be infinitely worse than the disease. The really comic thing is that an age such as this should try to be witty and humorous; for that is most certainly the last and most acrobatic way out of the ime. What, indeed, is there for an age of reflection and thought to defy with humour? For, being without ion, it has lost all feeling for the values of eros, for enthusiasm and sincerity in politics and religion, or for piety, iration and domesticity in everyday life. But even if the vulgar laugh, life only mocks at the wit which knows no values. To be witty without possessing the riches of inwardness is like squandering money upon luxuries and dispensing with necessities, or, as the proverb says, like selling one’s breeches to buy a wig. But an age without ion has no values, and everything is transformed into representational ideas. Thus there are certain remarks and expressions current which, though true and reasonable up to a point, are lifeless. On the other hand no hero, no lover, no thinker, no knight of the faith, no proud man, no man in despair would claim to have experienced them completely and personally. And just as one longs for the clink of real money after the crackle of bank-notes, one longs nowadays for a little originality. Yet what is more spontaneous than wit? It is more spontaneous, at least more surprising, even than the first bud of spring and the first tender shoots of grain. Why, even if spring carne according to agreement it would still be spring, but wit upon agreement would be disgusting. But, now, supposing that as a relief from feverish and sudden enthusiasms things went so far that wit, that divine accident—an additional favour which comes as a sign from the gods, from the mysterious source of

5 the inexplicable, so that not even the wittiest of men dares to say: to-morrow, but adoringly says: when it pleases the gods—but supposing that wit were to be transformed into its shabbiest contrary, a trivial necessity, so that it became a profitable branch of trade to manufacture and make up and remake, and buy up old and new witticisms — what an epigram on a witty age! In the end, therefore, money will be the one thing people will desire, which is moreover only representative, an abstraction. Nowadays a young man hardly envies anyone his gifts, his art, the love of a beautiful girl, or his fame; he only envies him his money. Give me money, he will say, and I am saved. But the young man will not run riot, he will not deserve what repentance repays. He would die with nothing to reproach himself with, and under the impression that if only he had had the money he might really have lived and might even have achieved something great. After these general observations, and having compared the present age with the revolutionary age, it will be in order to go back to the dialectical and categorical definitions of the present age, regardless whether they are present at a given moment or not. We are concerned here with the ‘how’ of the age, and this how’ must be defined from a universal standpoint, the final consequences of which can be reached by deduction, a posse ad esse, and verified by observation and experience ab esse ad posse. As far as its significance is concerned it is, of course, possible that the work of reflection, which is the task before the present age, may ultimately be explained in a higher form of existence. As for its quality, there is no doubt that the individual resting in his reflection can be just as well-intentioned as a ionate man who has made his decision; and conversely there may be just as much excuse for the man whose ions run away with him as for a man whose fault is never apparent, though he is cleverly aware that he lets himself be deceived by bis reflection. The results of reflection are both dangerous and unforeseeable because one can never tell whether the decision which saves a man from evil is reached after thorough consideration, or whether it is simply the exhaustion resulting from reflection which prevents him from doing wrong. One thing, however, is certain, an increased power of reflection like an increased knowledge only adds to man’s affliction, and above all it is certain that for the individual as for the generation no task is more difficult than to escape from the temptations of reflection, simply because they are so dialectical and the result of one clever discovery may give the whole question a new turn, because at any moment reflection is capable of explaining everything quite differently and allowing one some way of escape; because at the last moment of a reflective decision reflection is capable of changing everything — after one has made far greater exertions than are necessary to get a man of character into the midst of things. But these are only the excuses of reflection and the real position in reflection remains unchanged, for it is only altered within reflection. Even if a certain injustice is done to the present age when it is compared to a complete and closed period (the present age is still struggling with all the difficulties of

6 ‘becoming’, such a qualification is only a reflective qualification; and then, in return, its uncertainty is filled with hope. A ionate tumultuous age will overthrow everything, pull everything down; but a revolutionary age, that is at the same time reflective and ionless, transforms that expression of strength into a feat of dialectics: it leaves everything standing but cunningly empties it of significance. Instead of culminating in a rebellion it reduces the inward reality of all relationships to a reflective tension which leaves everything standing but makes the whole of life ambiguous: so that everything continues to exist factually whilst by a dialectical deceit, privatissime, it supplies a secret interpretation — that it does not exist. Morality is character, character is that which is engraved (); but the sand and the sea have no character and neither has abstract intelligence, for character is reality inwardness. Immorality, as energy, is also character; but to be neither moral nor immoral is merely ambiguous, and ambiguity enters into life when the qualitative distinctions are weakened by a gnawing reflection. The revolt of the ions is elemental, the dissolution brought about by ambiguity is a silent sorites 1 that goes on night and day. The distinction between good and evil is enervated by a superficial, superior and theoretical knowledge of evil, and by a supercilious cleverness which is aware that goodness is neither appreciated nor worth while in this world, that it is tantamount to stupidity. No one is any longer carried away by the desire for the good to perform great things, no one is precipitated by evil into atrocious sins, and so there is nothing for either the good or the bad to talk about, and yet for that very reason people gossip all the more, since ambiguity is tremendously stimulating and much more verbose than rejoicing over goodness or repentance over evil. The springs of life, which are only what they are because of the qualitative differentiating power of ion, lose their elasticity. The distance separating a thing from its opposite in quality no longer regulates the inward relation of things. Ali inwardness is lost, and to that extent the relation no longer exists, or else forms a colourless cohesion. The negative law is this: opposites are unable to dispense with each other and unable to hold together. The positive law is that they are able to dispense with each other and are able to hold together or, stated positively: opposites are unable to dispense with each other because of the connexion between them. But when the inward relation is wanting another takes its place: a quality is no longer related to its contrary; instead, the partners both stand and observe each other and the state of tension thus produced is really the end of the relationship. For example, the irer no longer cheerfully and happily acknowledges greatness, promptly expressing his appreciation, and then rebelling against its pride and arrogance. Nor is the relationship in any sense the opposite. The irer and the object of iration stand like two polite equals, and observe each other. A subject no longer freely honours his king or is angered at his 1

A form of sophism leading by gradual steps from truth to absurdity. — Tr.

7 ambition. To be a subject has come to mean something quite different; it means to be a third party. The subject ceases to have a position within the relationship; he has no direct relation to the king but simply becomes an observer and deliberately works out the problem; i.e. the relation of a subject to his king. For a time committee after committee is formed, so long, that is to say, as there are still people who ionately want to be what they ought to be; but in the end the whole age becomes a committee. A father no longer curses his son in anger, using all his parental authority, nor does a son defy his father, a conflict which might end in the inwardness of forgiveness; on the contrary, their relationship is irreproachable, for it is really in process of ceasing to exist, since they are no longer related to one another within the relationship; in fact it has become a problem in which the two partners observe each other as in a game, instead of having any relation to each other, and they note down each other’s remarks instead of showing a firm devotion. More and more people renounce the quiet and modest tasks of life, that are so important and pleasing to God, in order to achieve something greater; in order to think over the relationships of life in a higher relationship till in the end the whole generation has become a representation, who represent... it is difficult to say who; and who think about these relationships for whose sake it is not easy to discover. A disobedient youth is no longer in fear of his schoolmaster — the relation is rather one of indifference in which schoolmaster and pupil discuss how a good school should be run. To go to school no longer means to be in fear of the master, or merely to learn, but rather implies being interested in the problem of education. Again the differentiating relation of man to woman is never broken in an audaciously licentious manner; decency is observed in such a way that one can only describe these innocent borderline flirtations as trivial. What in fact should one call such relationships? A tension, 1 think, is the best description, not, however, a tension which strains the forces to breaking-point, but rather a tension which exhausts life itself and the fire of that enthusiasm and inwardness which makes the fetters of dependance and the crown of dominion light, which makes the child’s obedience and the father’s authority joyful, the iration of the subject and the exaltation of the great fearless, which gives recognized importance to the master and thus to the disciple occasion to learn, which unites woman’s weakness and man’s strength in the equal strength of devotion. As it is the relationships still exist but they lack the force which makes it possible for them to draw together in inwardness and unite in harrnony. lhe relationship expresses its presence and its absence sirnultaneously, not completely but rather as though it were drawled out, half-awake and uninterruptedly. Perhaps I can explain what I mean by a very simple illustration? I once knew a family who owned a grandfather clock whose works for some reason or other had got out of order. But the fault did not result in the spring suddenly unwinding, or in the chain breaking or in the hand ceasing to strike; on the contrary, it went on striking in a curiously abstract, though confusing, way. lt did not strike twelve times at twelve o’clock and once at one o’clock, but struck once ali through the day at regular intervais. It went on striking ali day long but never gave a definite time.

8 The same applies to a state of exhausted tension: the relationship continues; something is expressed with an abstract continuity which prevents any real break, but although it must nevertheless be described as an expression of the relationship, the relationship is not only ambiguously expressed, it is almost meaningless. It is this deceptive lull in the relationship which continues the relation as a fact; the danger is that it favours the cunning deprivations of reflection. Against a rebellion one can use force, and an obvious counterfeit has only to wait for its punishment; but dialecticai complications are difficult to root out, and it requires even better ears to track down the stealthy movement of reflection along its secret and ambiguous path. The established order of things continues to exist, but it is its ambiguity which satisfies our reflective and ionless age. No one, for example, wishes to do away with the power of the king, but if little by little it could be transformed into something purely fictitious every one would be quite prepared to cheer him. No one, for example, wishes to bring about the downfall of the eminent, but if distinction could be shown to be purely fictitious then every one would be prepared to ire it. In the sarne way people are quite prepared to leave the Christian terminology untouched, but they can surreptitiously interpolate that it involves no decisive thought. And so they remain unrepentant, for after all they have destroyed nothing. They no more desire a powerful king than an heroic liberator or religious authority. In all innocence they want the established order to continue, but they have the more or iess certain reflective knowledge that it no longer exists. lhen they proudly imagine that their attitude is ironical—as though real irony were not essentially a concealed enthusiasm in a negative age (just as the hero is enthusiasm made manifest in a positive age), as though irony did not involve sacrifice, when its greatest master was put to death. This reflective tension ultimately constitutes itself into a principie, and just as in a ionate age enthusiasm is the unifying principie, so in an age which is very reflective and ionless envy is the negative unifying principie. This must not, however, be interpreted as an ethical charge; the idea of reflection is, if one may so express it, envy, and it is therefore twofold in its action: it is selfish within the individual and it results in the selfishness of the society around him, which thus works against him. The envy in reflection (within the individual) prevents him making a decision ionately. If, for a moment, it should seem as though an individual were about to succeed in throwing off the yoke of reflection, he is at once pulled up by the opposition of the reflection which surrounds him. The envy which springs from reflection imprisons man’s will and his strength. First of all the individual has to break loose from the bonds of his own reflection, but even then he is not free. Instead he finds himself in the vast prison formed by the reflection of those around him, for because of his relation to his own reflection he also has a certain relation to the reflection around him. He can only escape from this second imprisonment through the inwardness of religion, no matter how clearly he may perceive the falseness of the situation.

9 With every means in its power reflection prevents people from realizing that both the individual and the age are thus imprisoned, not imprisoned by tyrants or priests or nobles or the secret police, but by reflection itself, and it does so by maintaining the flattering and conceited notion that the possibility of reflection is far superior to a mere decision. A selfish envy makes such demands upon the individual that by asking too much it prevents him from doing anything. It spoils him like an indulgent mother, for the envy within him prevents the individual from devoting himself to others. Moreover, the envy which surrounds him and in which he participates by envying others, is envious in a negative and critical sense. But the further it is carried the more clearly does the envy of reflection become a moral ressentiment. Just as air in a sealed space becomes poisonous, so the imprisonment of reflection develops a culpable ressentiment if it is not ventilated by action or incident of any kind. In reflection the state of strain (or tension as we called it) results in the neutralization of all the higher powers, and ali that is low and despicable comes to the fore, its very impudence giving the spurious effect of strength, while protected by its very baseness it avoids attracting the attention of ressentiment. It is a fundamental truth of human nature that man is incapable of remaining permanently on the heights, of continuing to ire anything. Human nature needs variety. Even in the most enthusiastic ages people have always liked to joke enviously about their superiors. That is perfectly in order and is entirely justiflable so long as after having laughed at the great they can once more iook upon them with iration; otherwise the game is not worth the candle. In that way ressentiment finds an outlet even in an enthusiastic age. And as long as an age, even though less enthusiastic, has the strength to give ressentiment its proper character and has made up its mmd what its expression signifles, ressentiment has its own, though dangerous, importance. In Greece, for example, the form ressentiment took was ostracism, a self defensive effort, as it were, on the part of the masses to preserve their equilibrium in face of the outstanding qualities of the eminent. The outstanding man was exiled, but every one understood how diaiectical the relationship was, ostracism being a mark of distinction. Thus, in representing a somewhat earlier period in the spirit of Aristophanes, it would be more ironical to let a completely unimportant person be ostracized than to let him become dictator, because ostracism is the negative mark of greatness. But it would be stiil better to let the story end with the peopie recalling the man whom they had ostracized because they could no longer do without him, and he wouid then be a complete mystery to the country of his exile, which wouid, of course, be quite unable to discover anything remarkabie about him. In The Knights Aristophanes gives us a picture of the final state of corruption in which the vulgar rabble ends when — just as in Tibet they worship the Dalai Lama’s excrement — they contemplate their own scum in its representatives; and that, in a democracy, is a degree of corruption comparable to auctioning the crown in a monarchy. But as long as ressentiment still has any character, ostracism is a negative mark of distinction. The man who told Aristides that he had voted for his exile ‘because he could not endure hearing Aristides called the only just man’ did not deny Aristides’ eminence, but itted something

10 about himself. He itted that his relation to distinction was the unhappy love of envy, instead of the happy love of iration, but he did not try to belittle that distinction. On the other side, the more reflection gets the upper hand and thus makes people indolent, the more dangerous ressentiment becomes, because it no longer has sufficient character to make it conscious of its significance. Bereft of that character reflection is cowardly and vacillating, and according to circumstances interprets the sarne thing in a variety of ways. It tries to treat it as a joke, and if that falls, to regard it as an insult, and when that falls, to dismiss it as nothing at all; or else it will treat the thing as a witticism, and if that falls then say that it was meant as a moral satire deserving attention, and if that does not succeed, add that it is not worth bothering about. Thus ressentiment becomes the constituent principle of want of character, which from utter wretchedness tries to sneak itself a position, all the time safeguarding itself by conceding that it is less than nothing. The ressentiment which results from want of character can never understand that eminent distinction really is distinction. Neither does it understand itself by recognizing distinction negatively (as in the case of ostracism) but wants to drag it down, wants to belittle it so that it really ceases to be distinguished. And ressentiment not only defends itseif against ali existing forms of distinction but against that which is stiil to come. The ressentiment which is establishing itself is the process of levelling, and while a ionate age storms ahead setting up new things and tearing down old, raising and demolishing as it goes, a reflective and ionless age does exactly the contrary: it hinders and stifles all action; it levels. Leveliing is a siient, mathematicai, and abstract occupation which shuns upheavals. In a burst of momentary enthusiasm people might, in their despondency, even long for a misfortune in order to feel the powers of life, but the apathy which follows is no more helped by a disturbance than an engineer levelling a piece of land. At its most violent a rebellion is like a volcanic eruption and drowns every other sound. At its maximum the levelling process is a deathly silence in which one can hear one’s heart beat, a science which nothing can pierce, in which everything is engulfed, powerless to resist. One man can be at the head of a rebellion, but no one can be at the head of the levelling process alone, for in that case he would be the leader and would thus escape being levelled. Each individual within his own little circle can cooperate in the levelling, but it is an abstract power, and the levelling process is the victory of abstraction over the individual. The levelling process in modern times, corresponds, in reflection, to fate in antiquity. The dialectic of antiquity tended towards leadership (the great individual and the masses — the free man and the slaves); so far the dialectic of Christendom tends towards representation (the majority sees itself in its representative and is set free by the consciousness that it is the majority which it represented, in a sort of selfconsciousness); the dialectic of the present age tends towards equality, and its most logical — though mistaken —

11 fulfillment is levelling, as the negative unity of the negative reciprocity of all individuals. It must be obvious to every one that the profound significance of the levelling process lies in the fact that it means the predominance of the category ‘generation’ over the category ‘individuality’. In antiquity the total number of the individuals was there to express, as it were, the value of the outstanding individual. Nowadays the standard of value has been changed so that equally, approximately so and so many men go to one individual, and one need only be sure of having the right number in order to have importance. In antiquity the individual in the masses had no importance whatsoever; the outstanding individual signified them all. The present age tends towards a mathematical equality in which equally in all classes approximately so and so many people go to one individual. Formerly the outstanding individual could allow himself everything and the individual in the masses nothing at ali. Now everyone knows that so and so many make an individual and quite consistently peopie add themselves together (it is called ing together, but that is only a polite euphemism) for the most trivial purposes. Simply in order to put a ing whim into practice a few people add themselves together, and the thing is done — then they dare do it. For that reason not even a preeminently gifted man can free himself from reflection, because he very soon becomes conscious of himself as a fractional part in some quite trivial matter, and so fails to achieve the infinite freedom of religion. The fact that several peopie united together have the courage to meet death does not nowadays mean that each, individually, has the courage, for, even more than death, the individual fears the judgement and protest of reflection upon his wishing to risk something on his own. The individual no longer belongs to God, to himself, to his beloved, to his art or to his science, he is conscious of belonging in all things to an abstraction to which he is subjected by reflection, just as a self belongs to an estate. That is why people band together in cases where it is an absolute contradiction to be more than one. The apotheosis of the positive principle of association is nowadays the devouring and demoralizing principle which in the slavery of reflection makes even virtues into vitia splendida. There is no other reason for this than that eternal responsibility, and the religious singling out of the individual before God, is ignored. When corruption sets in at that point people seek consolation in company, and so reflection catches the individual for life. And those who do not realize even the beginning of this crisis are engulfed without further ado in the reflective relationship. The levelling process is not the action of an individual but the work of reflection in the hands of an abstract power. It is therefore possible to calculate the law governing it in the same way that one calculates the diagonal in a parallelogram of forces. The individual who levels down is himself engulfed in the process and so on, and while he seems to know selfishly what he is doing one can only say of people en masse that they know not what they do; for just as collective enthusiasm produces a surplus which does not come from the individual, there is also a surplus in this case. A demon is called up over whom no individual has any power, and though the very abstraction of levelling gives the individual a momentary, selfish kind of enjoyment, he is at

12 the same time g the warrant for his own doom. Enthusiasm may end in disaster, but levelling is eo ipso the destruction of the individual. No age, and therefore riot the present age, can bring the scepticism of that process to a halt, for as soon as it tries to stop it, the law of the levelling process is again called into action. It can therefore only be held up by the individual attaining the religious courage which springs from his individual religious isolation. I was once the witness of a street flight in which three men most shamefully set upon a fourth. The crowd stood and watched them with indignation; expressions of disgust began to enliven the scene; then several of the onlookers set on one of the three assailants and knocked him down and beat him. The avengers had, in fact, applied precisely the same rules as the offenders. If I may be allowed to do so, I will introduce my own unimportant self into the story and continue. I went up to one of the avengers and tried by argument to explain to him how illogical his behaviour was; but it seemed quite impossible for him to discuss the question: he could only repeat that such a rascal richly deserved to have three people against him. The humour of the situation would have been even more apparent to some one who had not seen the beginning of the brawl, and so simply heard one man saying of another (who was alone) that he was three against one, and heard the remark just when the very reverse was the case — when they were three to one against him. In the first place it was humorous because of the contradiction which it involved, as when the policeman told a man standing in the street’ to kindly disperse’. Secondly it had all the humour of self contradiction. But what I learnt from it was that I had better give up all hope of putting a stop to that scepticism, lest it should turn upon me. No single individual (I mean no outstanding individual — in the sense of leadership and conceived according to the dialectical category ‘fate’) will be able to arrest the abstract process of levelling, for it is negatively something higher, and the age of chivalry is gone. No society or association can arrest that abstract power, simply because an association h itself in the service of the levelling process. Not even the individuality of the different nationalities can arrest it, for on a higher plane the abstract process of levelling is a negative representation of humanity pure and unalloyed. The abstract levelling process, that self-combustion of the human race, produced by the friction which arises when the individual ceases to exist as singled out by religion, is bound to continue, like a trade wind, and consume everything. But through it each individual for himself may receive once more a religious education and, in the highest sense, will be helped by the examen rigorosum of the levelling process to an essentially religious attitude. For the younger men who, however strongly they personality may cling to what they ire as eminent, realize from the beginning that the levelling process is evil in both the selfish individual and in the selfish generation, but that it can also, if they desire it honestly and before God, become the starting point for the highest life — for them it will indeed be an education to live in the age of levelling. Their age will, in the very highest sense, develop them religiously and at the same time educate them aesthetically and intellectually, because in this way the comic will receive its absolute expression. The highest form of the comic arises precisely when the individual comes directly under the infinite

13 abstraction of ‘pure humanity’, without any of those intermediary qualifications which temper the humour of man’s position and strengthen its pathos, without any of the concrete particulars of organization which the levelling process destroys. But that again is only another expression of the fact that man’s only salvation lies in the reality of religion for each individual. And it will add fuel to their enthusiasm to understand that it is in fact through error that the individual is given access to the highest, if he courageously desires it. But the levelling process will have to continue, and must be completed, just as the scandal had to come into the world, though woe to them by whom it comes. It has often been said that a reformation should begin with each man reforming himself. That, however, is not what actually happened, for the reformation produced a hero who paid God dearly enough for his position as hero. By ing up with him directly people buy cheap, indeed at bargain prices, what he had paid for so dearly; but they do not buy the highest of all things. The abstract principle of levelling, on the contrary, like the biting east wind, has no personal relation to any individual but has only an abstract relationship which is the same for every one. There, no hero suffers for others, or helps them; the taskmaster of all alike is the levelling process which itself takes on their education. And the man who learns most from the levelling and himself becomes greatest does not become an outstanding man or a hero — that would only impede the levelling process, which is rigidity consistent to the end — he himself prevents that from happening because he has understood the meaning of levelling; he becomes a man and nothing else, in the complete equalitarian sense. That is the idea of religion. But, under those conditions, the equalitarian order is severe and the profit is seemingly very small; seemingly, for unless the individual learns in the reality of religion and before God to be content with himself, and learns, instead of dominating others, to dominate himself, content as priest to be his own audience, and as author his own reader, if he will not learn to be satisfied with that as the highest, because it is the expression of the equality of all men before God and of our likeness to others, then he will not escape from reflection. It may be that for one deceptive moment it will seem to him, in relation to his gifts, as though he were levelling, but in the end he will sink down beneath the levelling process. There is no good calling upon a Holger Danske or a Martin Luther; their day is over and at bottom it is only the individual’s laziness which makes a man long to have them back, a worldly impatience which prefers to buy something cheap, second-hand, rather than to buy the highest of all things very dear and first-hand. It is worse than useless to found society after society, because negatively speaking there is something above them, even though the shortsighted member of the society cannot see it. The principle of individuality in its immediate and beautiful formation is symbolized for the generation in the outstanding and eminent individual; it groups subordinate individualities round the representative. This principle of individuality, in its eternal truth, uses the abstraction and equality of the generation to level down, and in that way co-operates in developing the individual religiously into a real man. For the levelling process is as powerful

14 where temporary things are concerned as it is impotent where eternal things are concerned. Reflection is a snare in which one is caught, but, once the ‘leap’ of enthusiasm has been taken, the relation is a different one and it becomes a noose which drags one into eternity. Reflection is and remains the hardest creditor in existence; hitherto it has cunningly bought up all the possible views of life, but it cannot buy the essentially religious and eternal view of life; on the other hand, it can tempt people astray with its dazzling brilliance, and dishearten them by reminding them of all the past. But, by leaping into the depths, one learns to help oneself, learns to love others as much as oneself, even though one is accused of arrogance and pride — because one will not accept help — or of selfishness, because one will not cunningly deceive people by helping them, i.e. by helping them to escape their highest destiny. Should any one complain that what 1 have set forth here is known to all and could be said by any one, then my answer is: the more the merrier — I am not asking for a position of eminence and I have nothing against every one knowing my opinion, unless that were to mean, in a sense, that it is to be taken from me and thereby put at the disposal of a negative association. So long as I have permission to retain them, my opinions do not lose their value by being known to every one. Throughout many changes the tendency in modern times has remained a levelling one. These changes themselves have not, however, all of them, been levelling, for they are none of them abstract enough, each having a certain concrete reality. To some extent it is true that the levelling process goes on when one great man attacks another, so that both are weakened, or when one is neutralized by the other, or when an association of people, in themselves weak, grow stronger than the eminent. Levelling can also be accomplished by one particular caste, e.g. the clergy, the bourgeois, the peasants, by the people themselves. But all that is only the first movement of an abstract power within the concreteness of individuality. In order that everything should be reduced to the same level, it is first of all necessary to procure a phantom, its spirit, a monstrous abstraction, an all-embracing something which is nothing, a mirage — and that phantom is the public. It is only in an age which is without ion, yet reflective, that such a phantom can develop itself with the help of the Press which itself becomes an abstraction. In times of ion and tumult and enthusiasm, even when a people desire to realize a fruitless idea and lay waste and destroy everything: even then there is no such thing as a public. There are parties and they are concrete. The Press, in times such as those, takes on a concrete character according to the division of parties. But just as sedentary professional people are the first to take up any fantastic illusion which comes their way, so a ionless, sedentary, reflective age, in which only the Press exhibits a vague sort of life, fosters this phantom. The public is, in fact, the real Levelling Master rather than the actual leveller, for whenever levelling is only approximately accomplished it is done by something, but the public is a monstrous nothing. The public is a concept which could not have occurred in antiquity because the people en masse, in corpore, took part in any situation

15 which arose, and were responsible for the actions of the individual, and, moreover, the individual was personally present and had to submit at once to applause or disapproval for his decision. Only when the sense of association in society is no longer strong enough to give life to concrete realities is the Press able to create that abstraction ‘ the public’, consisting of unreal individuals who never are and never can be united in an actual situation or organization — and yet are held together as a whole. The public is a host, more numerous than all the peoples together, but it is a body which can never be reviewed, it cannot even be represented, because it is an abstraction. Nevertheless, when the age is reflective and ionless and destroys everything concrete, the public becomes everything and is supposed to include everything. And that again shows how the individual is thrown back upon himself. The real moment in time and the real situation being simultaneous with real people, each of whom is something: that is what helps to sustain the individual. But the existence of a public produces neither a situation nor simultaneity. The individual reader of the Press is not the public, and even though little by little a number of individuals or even all of them should read it, the simultaneity is lacking. Years might be spent gathering the public together, and still it would not be there. This abstraction, which the individuals so illogically form, quite rightly repulses the individual instead of coming to his help. The man who has no opinion of an event at the actual moment accepts the opinion of the majority, or, if he is quarrelsome, of the minority. But it must be ed that both majority and minority are real people, and that is why the individual is assisted by adhering to them. A public, on the contrary, is an abstraction. To adopt the opinion of this or that man means that one knows that they will be subjected to the same dangers as oneself, that they will be led astray with one if the opinion leads astray. But to adopt the same opinion as the public is a deceptive consolation because the public is only there in abstracto. Whilst, therefore, no majority has ever been so certain of being right and victorious as the public, that is not much consolation to the individual, for a public is a phantom which forbids all personal . And if a man adopts public opinion today and is hissed to-morrow he is hissed by the public. A generation, a people, an assembly of the people, a meeting or a man, are responsible for what they are and can be made ashamed if they are inconstant and unfaithful; but a public remains a public. A people, an assembly or a man can change to such an extent that one may say: they are no longer the same; a public on the other hand can become the very opposite and still be the same — a public. But it is precisely by means of this abstraction and this abstract discipline that the individual will be formed (in so far as the individual is not already formed by his inner life), if he does not succumb in the process, taught to be content, in the highest religious sense, with himself and his relation to God, to be at one with himself instead of being in agreement with a public which destroys everything that is relative, concrete and particular in life; educated to find peace within himself and with God, instead of counting hands. And the ultimate difference between the modern

16 world and antiquity is: that ‘the whole’ is not concrete and is therefore unable to the individual, or to educate him as the concrete should (though without developing him absolutely), but is an abstraction which by its abstract equality repels him and thus helps him to be educated absolutely — unless he succumbs in the process. The taedium vitae so constant in antiquity was due to the fact that the outstanding individual was what others could not be; the inspiration of modern times will be that any man who finds himself, religiously speaking, has only achieved what every one can achieve. A public is neither a nation, nor a generation, nor a community, nor a society, nor these particular men, for all these are only what they are through the concrete; no single person who belongs to the public makes a real commitment; for some hours of the day, perhaps, he belongs to the public — at moments when he is nothing else, since when he really is what he is he does not form part of the public. Made up of such individuals, of individuals at the moments when they are nothing, a public is a kind of gigantic something, an abstract and deserted void which is everything and nothing. But on this basis any one can arrogate to himself a public, and just as the Roman Church chimerically extended its frontiers by appointing bishops in partibus infidelium, so a public is something which every one can claim, and even a drunken sailor exhibiting a ‘peep-show’ has dialectically absolutely the same right to a public as the greatest man; he has just as logical a right to put all those many noughts in front of his single number. A public is everything and nothing, the most dangerous of all powers and the most insignificant: one can speak to a whole nation in the name of the public, and still the public will be less than a single real man, however unimportant. The qualification ‘public’ is produced by the deceptive juggling of an age of reflection, which makes it appear flattering to the individual who in this way can arrogate to himself this monster, in comparison with which concrete realities seem poor. The public is the fairy story of an age of understanding, which in imagination makes the individual into something even greater than a king above his people2 but the public is also a gruesome abstraction through which the individual will receive his religious formation — or sink. The Press is an abstraction (since a paper is not a concrete part of a nation and only in an abstract sense an individual) which in conjunction with the ionless and reflective character of the age produces that abstract phantom: a public which in its turn is really the levelling power. Consequently it has an importance apart from its negative religious importance. The fewer ideas there are at any time, the more indolent and exhausted by bursts of enthusiasm will it be; nevertheless, if we imagine the Press growing weaker and weaker because no events or ideas catch hold of 2

As an author I have fortunately never sought for or had a public, but have contented myself with ‘the individual’, and on of that limitation have almost become a proverb [All Kierkegaard’s religious discourses, which form a large part of his works, were dedicated to “that individual, ‘whom with joy and thankfulness I call my reader because he reads, not thinking of the author, but of God”].

17 the age, the more easily will the process of levelling become a harmful pleasure, a form of sensual intoxication which flames up for a moment, simply making the evil worse and the conditions of salvation more difficult and the probability of decline more certain. Although the demoralization brought about by autocracy and the decay of revolutionary periods have often been described, the decay of an age without ion is something just as harmful, though, on of its ambiguity, it is less obvious. It may not be without interest to consider this point. More and more individuals, owing to their bloodless indolence, will aspire to be nothing at all — in order to become the public: that abstract whole formed in the most ludicrous way, by all participants becoming a third party (an onlooker). This indolent mass which understands nothing and does nothing itself, this gallery, is on the look-out for distraction and soon abandons itself to the idea that everything that any one does is done in order to give it (the public) something to gossip about. That indolent mass sits with its legs crossed, wearing an air of superiority, and anyone who tries to work, whether king, official, schoolteacher or the better type of journalist, the poet or the artist, has to struggle to drag the public along with it, while the public thinks in its own superior way that it is the horse. If I tried to imagine the public as a particular person (for although some better individuals momentarily belong to the public they nevertheless have something concrete about them, which holds them in its grip even if they have not attained the supreme religious attitude), I should perhaps think of one of the Roman emperors, a large well-fed figure, suffering from boredom, looking only for the sensual intoxication of laughter, since the divine gift of wit is not earthly enough. And so for a change he wanders about, indolent rather than bad, but with a negative desire to dominate. Every one who has read the classical authors knows how many things a Caesar could try out in order to kill time. In the same way the public keeps a dog to amuse it. That dog is the sum of the literary world. 3 If there is some one superior to the rest, perhaps even a great man, the dog is set on him and the fun begins. The dog goes for him, snapping and tearing at his coat-tails, allowing itself every possible illmannered familiarity — until the public tires, and says it may stop. That is an example of how the public levels. Their betters and superiors in strength are mishandled — and the dog remains a dog which even the public despises. The levelling is therefore done by a third party; a nonexistent public levelling with the help of a third party which in its insignificance is less than nothing, being already more than levelled. And so the public is unrepentant, for it was after all not the public that acted but the dog; just as one says to children—the cat’s mother did it. The public is unrepentant — it was not really belittling any one; it just wanted a little amusement. For had the levelling implement been remarkably energetic, the indolent public would have been fooled because the implement itself would have been in the way; but when their betters are held down by the insignificant and the insignificant by itse1f, then no one is quit of anything. 3

The Corsair, the paper in which Kierkegaard was lampooned.

18 The public is unrepentant, for it is not they who own the dog — they only subscribe. They neither set the dog on any one, nor whistle it off — directly. If asked they would answer: the dog is not mine, it has no master. And if the dog had to be killed they would say: it was really a good thing that badtempered dog was put down, every one wanted it killed — even the subscribers. Perhaps some one, familiarizing himself with such a case, and inclined to fix his attention upon the outstanding individual who suffered at the hands of the public, may be of the opinion that such an ordeal is a great misfortune. I cannot at all agree with such an opinion, for any one who really wishes to be helped to attain the highest is in fact benefited by undergoing such a misfortune, and must rather desire it even though people may be led to rebel. The really terrible thing is the thought of all the lives that are or easily may be wasted. I will not even mention those who are lost, or at any rate led completely astray: those who play the part of the dog for money, but the many who are helpless, thoughtless and sensual, who live superior lazy lives and never receive any deeper impression of existence than this meaningless grin, and all those bad people who are led into further temptation because in their stupidity they even become self-important by commiserating with the one who is attacked, without even understanding that in such a position the person attacked is always the stronger, without understanding that in this case the terrible and ironical truth applies: Weep not over him but over yourselves. That is the levelling process at its lowest, for it always equates itself to the divisor by means of which every one is reduced to a common denominator. Eternal life is also a sort of levelling, and yet that is not so, because the common denominator is that every one should really and essentially be a man in a religious sense. Hitherto I have been dealing with the dialectical categories and qualifications, and with their consequences, whether actually present at any given moment or not. I shall now abandon the dialectical analysis of the present age in order to arrive dialectically at its concrete affirmations regarding everyday life. It is here that the darker side will be seen; but although this cannot be denied, it is equally certain that just as reflection itself is not evil, so a very reflective age has its lighter side, simply because a higher degree of reflection implies greater significance than immediate ion; for when enthusiasm intervenes to gather the powers of reflection together into a decision, and because reflection confers, on the average, a greater capacity for action — then, when religion enters in, it takes command of that increased capacity for action. Reflection is not the evil; but a reflective condition and the deadlock which it involves, by transforming the capacity for action into a means of escape from action, is both corrupt and dangerous, and leads in the end to a retrograde movement.

19 The present age is essentially one of understanding lacking in ion, and has therefore abolished the principle of contradiction. By comparison with a ionate age, an age without ion gains in scope what it loses in intensity. But this scope may once again become the condition of a still higher form, if a corresponding intensity assumes control of the extended field of activity which is put at its disposal. The abolition of the principle of contradiction, expressed in of existence, means to live in contradiction with oneself. The creative omnipotence of the differentiating power of ion, which makes the individual completely at one with himself is transformed into the extended scope of reflective understanding: as a result of knowing and being everything possible, one is in contradiction with oneself, i.e. nothing at all. The principle of contradiction strengthens the individual’s faithfulness to himself and makes him as constant as the number three spoken of so beautifully by Socrates, when he says that it would rather endure anything than become four or even a large round number, and in the same way the individual would rather suffer and be true to himself than be all manner of things in contradiction with himself. What is talkativeness? It is the result of doing away with the vital distinction between talking and keeping silent. Only some one who knows how to remain essentially silent can really talk—and act essentially. Silence is the essence of inwardness, of the inner life. Mere gossip anticipates real talk, and to express what is still in thought weakens action by forestalling it. But some one who can really talk, because he knows how to remain silent, will not talk about a variety of things but about one thing only, and he will know when to talk and when to remain silent. Where mere scope is concerned, talkativeness wins the day, it jabbers on incessantly about everything and nothing. When people’s attention is no longer turned inwards, when they are no longer satisfied with their own inner religious lives, but turn to others and to things outside themselves, where the relation is intellectual, in search of that satisfaction, when nothing important ever happens to gather the threads of life together with the finality of a catastrophe: that is the time for talkativeness. In a ionate age great events (for they correspond to each other) give people something to talk about. Talkativeness, on the contrary, has, in quite another sense, plenty to talk about. And when the event is over, and silence follows, there is still something to and to think about while one remains silent. But talkativeness is afraid of the silence which reveals its emptiness. The law governing artistic production applies, on a smaller scale, to every one in daily life. Every man who has a real experience experiences at the same time all its possibilities in an ideal sense, including the opposite possibility. Aesthetically these possibilities are his lawful property. Not so, however, his private and personal reality. His talk and his production both rest upon his silence. The ideal perfection of his talk and of his production will correspond to his silence, and the absolute expression of that silence will be that the ideal will include the qualitatively opposite possibility. But as soon as the artist prostitutes his own reality he is no longer essentially productive. His beginning is his end, and his very first word will be a sin against the modesty of the ideal. This type of artistic production is therefore even, aesthetically

20 speaking, a kind of private gossip. It is easily recognized because it is not balanced by its opposite; for ideality is the balance of opposites. For example, if the man who is moved to write by suffering is really initiated into the realm of ideals, he will reproduce the happiness as well as the suffering of his experience with the same affection. The condition of his attaining this ideal is the silence with which he shuts off his own real personality. Otherwise, in spite of all precautions, such as changing the scene to Africa, his one-sided predilection will be privately recognizable. For an author, like any one else, must have his own private personality, but it must be his own 4; and just as the entrance to a house is barred by the crossed bayonets of the guards, the approach to a man’s personality is barred by the dialectical cross of qualitative opposites in an ideal equilibrium. What is true of the greater relationship and is very clear in the above circumstances, which is why they were instanced, is also true in a lesser degree of the smaller ones; and, once again, silence is the conditio sine qua non of all educated social intercourse. The more thoroughly man grasps the ideal and the idea — in silence — the more capable will he be of reproducing man’s daily life so that it seems as though he only talked of particular things at a certain distance. The less ideal, the more superficial his talk, and his conversation will become a meaningless repetition of names, of’ absolutely reliable’ private information of what this and that person — mentioning all their names — had said, &c. &c., and conversation in general will take on a talkative confidential note about what one is doing or going to do, what one would have said on a certain occasion, which particular girl one is making love to, why nevertheless one does not want to marry. The introspection of silence is the condition of all educated social intercourse; the exteriorized caricature of inwardness is vulgarity and talkativeness. One finds excellent examples of the kind of talkativeness I am referring to in the novel.5 It consists entirely of trivialities, people’s names are always mentioned and they are people whose trivial way of life is interesting because of their names. People who are talkative certainly chatter away about something and, indeed, their one wish is to have an excuse for more gossip, but the subject is non-existent from the ideal point of view. It always consists of some trivial fact such as that Mr. Marsden is engaged and has given his fiancée a Persian shawl; that Petersen, the poet, is going to write some new poems, or that Marcussen, the actor, mispronounced a certain word last night. If we could suppose for a moment that there was a law which did not forbid people talking, but simply ordered that everything which was spoken about should be treated as though it had happened fifty years ago, the gossips would be done for, they would be in despair. On the other hand, it would not really interfere with any one who could really talk. That an actor should have mispronounced a word could only be interesting if there was something interesting in the mispronunciation itself, in which case the fifty years make no difference — but Miss Gusta, for example, would be in despair, she who had been at the theatre that very evening, in a box with Alderman Waller’s wife; 4 5

Holy of Holies. Which Kierkegaard was reviewing: The Two Ages.

21 for was it not she who noticed the slip and even noticed a member of the chorus smiling, &c. &c. It really would be a shame and cruelty to all those silly gossiping people who must all the same be allowed to live — and so the law is only posited. With gossip, therefore, the vital distinction between what is private and what is public is obliterated, and everything is reduced to a kind of private-public gossip which corresponds more or less to the public of which it forms part. The public is public opinion which interests itself in the most private concerns. Something that nobody would dare to tell to a gathering, that nobody could talk about, and which even the gossips would not like to it to having gossiped about, can perfectly well be written for the public and, as a member of the public, people may know all about it. What is formlessness? It is the result of doing away with the vital distinction between form and content. Formlessness may, therefore, unlike madness or stupidity, have a content that is true, but the truth it contains can never be essentially true. It will be capable of being extended so as to include everything or touch upon everything, whereas a real content is clearly, and, if one likes, miserably limited because of its intensity and self absorption. The universality of formlessness in a ionless but reflective age is expressed, moreover, not only by the fact that the most varied ideas are found dallying in the same company but by the diametrically opposite fact that people find a paramount longing for and pleasure in acting on principle’. A principle, as the word indicates, is what comes first, i.e. the substance, the idea in the undeveloped form of feeling and of enthusiasm which drives on the individual by its own inner power. That is entirely wanting in a ionless individual. To him a principle is something purely external for the sake of which he does one thing as willingly as another, and the opposite of both into the bargain. The life of an individual without ion is not the development of a self-revealing principle. On the contrary, his inner life is something hurrying along, always on the move and always hurrying to do something ‘on principle’. A principle, in that sense, becomes a monstrous something or other, an abstraction, just like the public. And while the public is something or other so monstrous that not all the nations of the world and all the souls in eternity put together are as numerous, every one, even a drunken sailor, can have a public, and the same is true of ‘a principle’. It is something immense which even the most insignificant man can add to the most insignificant action, and thus become tremendously self-important. When an honest insignificant man suddenly becomes a hero for the sake of a principle, the result is quite as comic as though fashion decreed that every one was to wear a cap with a peak thirty feet long. If a man had a little button sewn on the inner pocket of his coat ‘on principle’ his otherwise unimportant and quite serviceable action would become charged with importance — it is not improbable that it would result in the formation of a society. It is acting on principle’ which does away with the vital distinction which constitutes decency. For decency is immediate (whether the immediateness is original or acquired). It has its seat in feeling and in the

22 impulse and consistency of an inner enthusiasm. ‘On principle’ one can do anything and what one does is, fundamentally, a matter of indifference, just as a man’s life remains insignificant even though ‘on principle’ he gives his to all the ‘needs of the times’, even when, by virtue of being a mute and in that capacity as ‘the organ of public opinion’ he is as well known as the figures on a barrel-organ that can move forward and bow, plate in hand. ‘On principle’ a man can do anything, take part in anything and himself remain inhuman and indeterminate. ‘On principle’ a man may interest himself in the founding of a brothel (there are plenty of social studies on the subject written by the health authorities), and the same man can ‘on principle’ assist in the publication of a new Hymn Book because it is supposed to be the great need of the times. But it would be as unjustifiable to conclude from the first fact that he was debauched as it would, perhaps, be to conclude from the second that he read or sang hymns. In this way everything becomes permissible if done ‘on principle’. The police can go to certain places on ‘official duty’ to which no one else can go, but as a result one cannot deduce anything from their presence. In the same way one can do anything ‘on principle’ and avoid all personal responsibility. People pull to pieces ‘on principle’ what they ire personally, which is nonsensical, for while it is true that everything creative is latently polemical, since it has to make room for the new which it is bringing into the world, a purely destructive process is nothing and its principle is emptiness — so what does it need space for? But modesty, repentance and responsibility cannot easily strike root in ground where everything is done, ‘on principle ‘. What is superficiality and the desire to show off? Superficiality is the result of doing away with the vital distinction between concealment and manifestation. It is the manifestation of emptiness, but where mere scope is concerned it wins, because it has the advantage of dazzling people with its brilliant shams. Real manifestation is homogeneous, because it is really profound, whereas superficiality has a varied and omnium gatherum appearance. Its love of showing off is the self-iration of conceit in reflection. The concealment and reserve of inwardness is not given time in which to conceive an essential mystery, which can then be made manifest, but is disturbed long before that time comes and so, as a reward, reflection attracts the gaze of egotism upon its varied shams whenever possible. What is flirtation? It is the result of doing away with the vital distinction between real love and real debauchery. Neither the real lover nor the real debauchee are guilty of flirting. A flirtation only toys with the possibility and is therefore a form of indulgence which dares to touch evil and fails to realize the good. To act ‘on principle ‘is also a kind of flirtation, because it reduces moral action to an abstraction. But in mere scope flirtation has all the advantages, for one can flirt with anything, but one can only really love one girl. From the point of view of love, properly understood, any addition is really a subtraction (even though in a confused age a capricious man may be blinded by pleasure), and the more one adds the more one takes away. What is reasoning? It is the result of doing away with the vital distinction which separates subjectivity and objectivity. As a form of abstract

23 thought reasoning is not profoundly dialectical enough; as an opinion and a conviction it lacks full-blooded individuality. But where mere scope is concerned, reasoning has all the apparent advantage; for a thinker can encom his science, a man can have an opinion upon a particular subject and a conviction as a result of a certain view of life, but one can reason about anything. In our own day anonymity has acquired a far more pregnant significance than is perhaps realized: it has an almost epigrammatic significance. People not only write anonymously, they sign their anonymous works: they even talk anonymously. The very soul of a writer should go into his style, and a man puts his whole personality into the style of his conversation, though limited by the exception which Matthias Claudius noted when he said that if any one conjured a book its esprit should appear— unless there was no esprit in it. Nowadays one can talk with any one, and it must be itted that people’s opinions are exceedingly sensible, yet the conversation leaves one with the impression of having talked to an anonymity. The same person will say the most contradictory things and, with the utmost calm, make a remark, which coming from him is a bitter satire on his own life. The remark itself may be sensible enough, and of the kind that sounds well at a meeting, and may serve in a discussion preliminary to coming to a decision, in much the same way that paper is made out of rags. But all these opinions put together do not make one human, personal opinion such as you may hear from quite a simple man who talks about very little but really does talk. People’s remarks are so objective, so all-inclusive, that it is a matter of complete indifference who expresses them, and where human speech is concerned that is the same as acting ‘on principle’. And so our talk becomes like the public, a pure abstraction. There is no longer any one who knows how to talk, and instead, objective thought produces an atmosphere, an abstract sound, which makes human speech superfluous, just as machinery makes man superfluous. In they even have phrase-books for the use drivers, and it will end with lovers sitting together talking anonymously. In fact there are handbooks for everything, and very soon education, all the world over, will consist in learning a greater or lesser number of comments by heart, and people will excel according to their capacity for singling out the various facts like a printer singling out the letters, but completely ignorant of the meaning of anything. Thus our own age is essentially one of understanding, and on the average, perhaps, more knowledgeable than any former generation, but it is without ion. Every one knows a great deal, we all know which way we ought to go and all the different ways we can go, but nobody is willing to move. If at last some one were to overcome the reflection within him and happened to act, then immediately thousands of reflections would form an outward obstacle. Only a proposal to reconsider a plan is greeted with enthusiasm; action is met by indolence. Some of the superior and self-satisfied find the enthusiasm of the man who tried to act ridiculous, others are envious because he made a beginning when, after all, they knew just as well as he did what should be done — but did not do it. Still others use the fact that some one has acted in order to produce numerous critical observations and give vent to a store of arguments, demonstrating how much more sensibly the

24 thing could have been done; others again, busy themselves guessing the outcome and, if possible, influencing events a little so as to favour their own hypothesis. It is said that two English noblemen were once riding along a road when they met a man whose horse had run away with him and who, being in danger of falling off, shouted for help. One of the Englishmen turned to the other and said, ‘A hundred guineas he falls off.’ ‘Taken,’ said the other. With that they spurred their horses to a gallop and hurried on ahead to open the toil-gates and to prevent anything from getting in the way of the runaway horse. In the same way, though without that heroic and millionaire-like spleen, our own reflective and sensible age is like a curious, critical and worldly-wise person who, at the most, has vitality enough to lay a wager. Life’s existential tasks have lost the interest of reality; illusion cannot build a sanctuary for the divine growth of inwardness which ripens to decisions. One man is curious about another, every one is undecided, and their way of escape is to say that some one must come who will do something — and then they will bet on him. It is quite impossible for the community or the idea of association to save our age. On the contrary, association is the scepticism, which is necessary in order that the development of individuality may proceed uniformly, so that the individual will either be lost or, disciplined by such abstractions, will find himself religiously. Nowadays the principle of association (which at the most is only valid where material interests are concerned) is not positive but negative; it is an escape, a distraction and an illusion. Dialectically the position is this: the principle of association, by strengthening the individual, enervates him; it strengthens numerically, but ethically that is a weakening. It is only after the individual has acquired an ethical outlook, in face of the whole world, that there can be any suggestion of really ing together. Otherwise the association of individuals who are in themselves weak, is just as disgusting and as harmful as the marriage of children. Formerly the sovereign and the great each had their opinion and the rest were satisfied and decided enough to realize that they dared not or could not have an opinion. Now every one can have an opinion; but they have to band together numerically in order to have one. Twenty-five signatures make the most frightful stupidity into an opinion, and the considered opinion of a first-class mind is only a paradox. But when the context is meaningless it is useless to take a broad survey. The best that can be done is to consider each part of speech by itself. And if only nonsense comes out of a man’s mouth it is useless to try and make a coherent speech, and it is better to take each word separately — and so with individuals. The change which will come about is this. In the old order (which sprang from the relation between the individual and the generation) the officers, generals, heroes (i.e. the man of distinction, the leader within his own sphere) were recognizable, and every one (in proportion to his authority), with his little detachment, fitted picturesquely and organically into the whole, both

25 ing and ed by the whole. From now on the great man, the leader (according to his position) will be without authority because he will have divinely understood the diabolical principle of the levelling process; he will be unrecognizable; he will keep his distinction hidden like a plain-clothes policeman, and his will only be negative, i.e. repelling people, whereas the infinite indifference of abstraction judges every individual and examines him in his isolation. This order is dialectically the very opposite of that of the Prophets and Judges, and just as the danger for them lay in their authority not being recognized so nowadays the unrecognizable is in danger of being recognized, and of being persuaded to accept recognition and importance as an authority, which could only hinder the highest development. For they are unrecognizable and go about their work like secret agents, not because of any private instruction from God! — for that is the case of Prophets and Judges — but are unrecognizable (without authority) because they have understood the universal in equality before God, and, because they realize this and their own responsibility every moment, are thus prevented from being guilty of thoughtlessly realizing in an inconsistent form this consistent perception. This order is dialectically the opposite of the organizing order symbolized in the outstanding personality, which makes the generation into a for the individual, whereas now, like an abstraction, the generation is negatively ed by the unrecognizable, and turns polemically against the individual — in order to save every single individual religiously. And so when the generation, which itself desired to level and to be emancipated, to destroy authority and at the same time itself, has, through the scepticism of the principle association, started the hopeless forest fire of abstraction; when as a result of levelling with this scepticism, the generation has rid itself of the individual and of everything organic and concrete, and put in its place ‘humanity’ and the numerical equality of man and man: when the generation has, for a moment, delighted in this unlimited panorama of abstract infinity, unrelieved by even the smallest eminence, undisturbed by even the slightest interest, a sea of desert; then the time has come for work to begin, for every individual must work for himself, each for himself. No longer can the individual, as in former times, turn to the great for help when he grows confused. That is past; he is either lost in the dizziness of unending abstraction or saved for ever in the reality of religion. Perhaps very many will cry out in despair, but it will not help them — already it is too late. If it is true that in former times authorities and powers were misused and brought upon themselves the nemesis of revolution, it was weakness and impotence which, desiring to stand alone, brought this final nemesis upon them. Nor shall any of the unrecognizable presume to help directly or to speak directly or to teach directly at the head of the masses, in order to direct their decisions, instead of giving his negative and so helping the individual to make the decision which he himself has reached; any other course would be the end of him, because he would be indulging in the short-sighted comion of man, instead of obeying the order of divinity, of an angry, yet so merciful, divinity. For the development is, in spite of everything, a progress because all the individuals who are saved will receive the specific weight of religion, its essence at first hand, from God himself. Then it will be said: ‘ behold, all is in readiness, see how the cruelty of abstraction makes the true form of

26 worldliness only too evident, the abyss of eternity opens before you, the sharp scythe of the leveller makes it possible for every one individually to leap over the blade — and behold, it is God who waits. Leap, then, into the arms of God’. But the ‘unrecognizable’ neither can nor dares help man, not even his most faithful disciple, his mother, or the girl for whom he would gladly give his life: they must make the leap themselves, for God’s love is not a second-hand gift. And yet the ‘unrecognizable’ (according to his degree) will have a double work compared with the ‘outstanding’ man (of the same degree), because he will not only have to work continuously, but at the same time labour to conceal his work. But the desolate abstraction of the levelling process will always be continued by its servants, lest it should end with a return of the old order. The servants of the levelling process are the servants of the powers of evil, for levelling itself does not come from divinity and all good men will at times grieve over its desolation, but divinity allows it and desires to bring the highest into relation with the individual, i.e. with each and every man. The servants of the levelling process are known to him who is ‘unrecognizable’, but he dare not use either power or authority against them, for that would be to reverse the development, since it would become immediately apparent to a third person that the’ unrecognizable’ was an authority, and in that way the third man would be prevented from attaining to the highest. Only by suffering can the ‘unrecognizable’ dare to help on the levelling process and, by the same suffering action, judge the instruments. He dare not overcome the levelling process directly, that would be his end, for it would be the same as acting with authority. But he will overcome it in suffering, and in that way express once more the law of his existence, which is not to dominate, to guide, to lead, but to serve in suffering and help indirectly. Those who have not made the leap will look upon his unrecognizable action, his suffering as failure; those who have made the leap will suspect that it was victory, but they can have no certainty, for they could only be made certain by him, and if he gave that certainty to a single person it would be the end of him, because he would have been unfaithful to the divinity in desiring to play at being authority: that would mean that he had failed; not only by being unfaithful to God in trying to use authority, but because he did not obey God and teach men to love one another by compelling himself, so that even though they begged him to do so he should not have deceived them by exerting authority. But I break off. All this is only fooling, for if it is true that every man must work for his own salvation, then all the prophecies about the future of the world are only valuable and allowable as a recreation, or a joke, like playing bowls or cards. But it must always be ed that reflection is not in itself something harmful, that, on the contrary, it is necessary to work through it in order that one’s actions should be more intensive. The stages of all actions which are performed with enthusiasm are as follows: first of all comes immediate enthusiasm, then follows the stage of cleverness which, because

27 immediate enthusiasm does not calculate, assumes with a calculating cleverness the appearance of being the higher; and finally comes the highest and most intensive enthusiasm which follows the stage of cleverness, and is therefore able to see the shrewdest plan of action but disdain it, and thereby receive the intensity of an eternal enthusiasm. For the time being, however, and for some time to come, this really intensive enthusiasm will remain completely misunderstood, and the question is whether it can ever become popular, i.e. whether one may presume upon such a degree of cleverness in the average man that cleverness will no longer seduce and enchant him, and may presume that he will be able to dominate it by having attained the highest form of enthusiasm, but as it were squander it — for an enthusiastic action, being always the opposite of shrewd, is never obvious. The enthusiasm of Socrates was not immediate. On the contrary, he was clever enough to see what he had to do in order to escape, although he disdained to act according to that opinion, just as he refused the proffered speech. That is why there is nothing obvious about his heroic death, and even in death he remained ironical by putting to the shrewd and the clever the question whether he could really have been clever, since he did the reverse. That is the point at which cleverness is left hanging in mid-air, hoisted with its own reflective judgement and that of the world about it, afraid that an action performed in the teeth of cleverness may be confused with an action performed without cleverness. An immediate enthusiasm does not know such a danger, and therefore requires the impetus of the most intense enthusiasm in order to get through life. Such an enthusiasm is not mere rhetorical twaddle about high seriousness ‘, a still ‘higher seriousness ‘and an all highest seriousness’. It can be known from its category: that it acts against understanding. Neither does immediate goodness know the danger of reflection — where goodness and weakness are mistaken and confused; and it is precisely for that reason that, after reflection, it requires a religious impetus to set goodness afloat again. In our times, when so little is done, an extraordinary number of prophecies, apocalypses, glances at and studies of the future appear, and there is nothing to do but to in and be one with the rest. Yet I have the advantage over the many who bear a heavy responsibility when they prophesy and give warnings, because I can be perfectly certain that no one would think of believing me. So I do not ask that any one should make a cross in their calendar or otherwise bother to see whether my words are fulfilled. If they are fulfilled, then people will have something else to think about than my accidental being and if they are not fulfilled, well, then I shall simply be a prophet in the modern sense of the word — for a prophet nowadays means to prognosticate and nothing more. In a certain sense a prophet cannot do anything else. It was providence that fulfilled the words of the older prophets, so perhaps we modern prophets, lacking the addition coming from providence, might say with Thales: what we predict will either happen or not; for to us too has God granted the gift of prophecy.