Digests (compiled From The Net) 201r6p

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Digests 1. Mirallosa vs carmel devt inc FACTS: Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the ed owner of a Caloocan property known as the Pangarap Village located at Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. The said property is ed under the name of Carmel Farms Inc. under a Transfer Certificate Title (TCT). One of the lots in the said title is presently occupied by Petitioner Moreto Mirallosa. On September 14, 1973, P.D. 293 was issued invalidating the titles of respondent and declared them open for disposition to the of the Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc. (MHAI). However, on January 29, 1988 as decided on the case of Tuason, P.D. 293 was declared as unconstitutional. In effect, on February 17, 1988 Carmel Farms Inc. restored its ownership of the property. Meanwhile, sometime in 1995, Petitioner took over the lot in question by virtue of an Affidavit executed by Pelagio M. Juan (petitioner’s predecessor who was a member of MHAI).In the basis of Tuason case, the respondent filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer before the Metropolitan Trial court (MeTC) wherefore the petitioner was ordered to vacate the property in question among others. The petitioner appealed to the RTC. RTC then rendered a Decision to reverse and set aside the findings of MeTC which led to dismissal of the complaint. On September 24, 2008, respondent appealed to Court of Appeals and decided to reversed and set aside the Decision of RTC and then reinstated the decision of MeTC. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case (2) Whether or not Tuason case may be applied here, despite petitioner not being a party to the case (3) Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith HELD: (1) Yes. In this case, what was once a legal possession of petitioner, emanating from P.D. 293, later became illegal by the pronouncement in Tuason that the law was unconstitutional.

(2) Yes. Tuason may be applied despite petitioner not being a party to that case, because an unconstitutional law produces no effect and confers no right upon any person. (3) No. Since petitioner only started occupying the property sometime in 1995, or about seven years after Tuason was promulgated, he should have been aware of the binding effect of that ruling. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, its existence should be on one hand, x x x matter of mandatory judicial notice; on the other, ignorantia. legis non excusat. 2. People vs mateo FACTS: The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10 counts of rape and to indemnify the complainant for actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed to the CA. Solicitor General assailed the factual findings of the TC and recommends an acquittal of appellant. ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of express provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death. RULING: Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution – Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

Digests “(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: “x x x x x x x x x “(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.” It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favour of the accused. In ing, during the deliberations among the of the Court, there has been a marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues. 3. People vs gutirrez FACTS: 1. In the morning of May 22, 1970, a group of armed persons set fire to various inhabited houses in barrio Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur. 2. On the afternoon of the same day, several residential houses were likewise burned in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and province, which resulted to the destruction of various houses and resulted in the death of an old woman.

Page 2 of 13 3. Two informations were filed in the Court of First Instance (one for arson with homicide and the other for arson), charging the 17 private respondents, together with 82 other unidentified persons, “confederating, conspiring, constabulating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or caused to be burned several residential houses, knowing the said houses to be occupied.” 4. Two of the accused furnished bail and voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 5. The Secretary of Justice issued istrative Order No. 221, authorizing the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District to hold a special in Ilocos Sur. 6. Three days after, the Secretary of Justice further issued istrative Order No. 226, authorizing respondent Judge to transfer the criminal cases to the Circuit Criminal Court. 7. The prosecution moved the respondent Judge for a transfer of said cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the abovementioned istrative Orders and calling attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses for reason of security and personal safety. 8. The accused opposed such transfer and the respondent Judge declined the transfer sought on the ground that said istrative Order only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for more expeditious disposalof the cases; and in the cases involved the accused had already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain a change of

Digests venue from the Supreme Court under Sec. 4 of RA No. 5179 the same should have been done right at the very inception of these cases. RA 5179 created the Criminal Circuit Courts for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the CFI, and to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, but nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts. 9. In view of the lower court’s denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Criminal Court,the prosecution resorted to the SC for writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying to set aside the order of denial of transfer and to compel the CFI to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Secondary Judicial District. 10. Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that the istrative Order merely authorized the court below, but did not require or command it. ISSUE: Whether the lower court committed abuse of discretion in denying to transfer cases to the Circuit Criminal Court. RULING: YES. Respondent Judge, in construing istrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the EOs mentioned. HOWEVER, in refusing to consider Department AO No. 226 of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory, respondent Judge failed to act upon the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases should be transferred to the Criminal Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the

Page 3 of 13 court where they felt their lives would be endangered. This refusal by the witnesses to testify due to security and safety manifest the imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of truth and justice and the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side of the case. The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the SC, and such inferior courts as may be established by law, and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective istration of justice. The courts “can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government”. One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands. Thus, the SC held: 1. That RA No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not, and does not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and individual cases; 2. That the SC, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by the Constitution upon it and other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a CFI be transferred to another CFI within the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice. 3. That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate

Digests reasons for the transfer of the hearing of th.e said criminal cases of the CFI of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and justice 4. Commissioner of int revenue vs san roque power corp FACTS: • On October 11, 1997, San Roque Power Corporation (San Roque) entered into a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with the National Power Corporation (NPC) by building the San Roque Multi-Purpose Project in San Manuel, Pangasinan. • The San Roque Multi-Purpose Project allegedly incurred, excess input VAT in the amount of P559,709,337.54 for taxable year 2001 which it declared in its Quarterly VAT Returns filed for the same year. • San Roque duly filed with the BIR separate claims for refund, amounting to P559,709,337.54, representing unutilized input taxes as declared in its VAT returns for taxable year 2001. • However, on March 28, 2003, San Roque filed amended Quarterly VAT Returns for the year 2001 since it increased its unutilized input VAT To the amount of P560,200,283.14. San Roque filed with the BIR on the same date, separate amended claims for refund in the aggregate amount of P560,200,283.14. • On April 10, 2003, a mere 13 days after it filed its amended istrative claim with the CIR on March 28, 2003, San Roque filed a Petition for Review with the CTA. • CIR alleged that the claim by San Roque was prematurely filed with the CTA. ISSUE: • WON San Roque is entitled to tax refund? – NO. HELD:

Page 4 of 13 • No. San Roque is not entitled to a tax refund because it failed to comply with the mandatory and jurisdictional requirement of waiting 120 days before filing its judicial claim. • On April 10, 2003, a mere 13 days after it filed its amended istrative claim with the CIR on March 28, 2003, San Roque filed a Petition for Review with the CTA, which showed that San Roque did not wait for the 120-day period to lapse before filing its judicial claim. • Compliance with the 120-day waiting period is mandatory and jurisdictional, under RA 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997. Failure to comply renders the petition void. • It violates the doctrine of exhaustion of istrative remedies and renders the petition premature and without a cause of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over the taxpayer’s petition. • Article 5 of the Civil Code provides, "Acts executed against provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity." • Thus, San Roque’s petition with the CTA is a mere scrap of paper. • Well-settled is the rule that tax refunds or credits, just like tax exemptions, are strictly construed against the taxpayer. • Whether the Atlas doctrine or the Mirant doctrine is applied to San Roque is immaterial because what is at issue in the present case is San Roque’s noncompliance with the 120-day mandatory and jurisdictional period, which is counted from the date it filed its istrative claim with the CIR. The 120-day period may extend beyond the two-year prescriptive period, as long as the istrative claim is filed within the two-year prescriptive period. However, San Roque’s fatal mistake is that it did not wait for the CIR to decide within the 120-

Digests day period, a mandatory period whether the Atlas or the Mirant doctrine is applied. • Section 112(D) of the 1997 Tax Code is clear, unequivocal, and categorical that the CIR has 120 days to act on an istrative claim. The taxpayer can file the judicial claim (1) Only within 30 days after the CIR partially or fully denies the claim within the 120- day period, or (2) only within 30 days from the expiration of the 120- day period if the CIR does not act within the 120-day period. • Even if, contrary to all principles of statutory construction as well as plain common sense, we gratuitously apply now Section 4.106-2(c) of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, still San Roque cannot recover any refund or credit because San Roque did not wait for the 60-day period to lapse, contrary to the express 5. Laureta vs eva maravilla-ilustre Facts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, all of the First Division. Ilustre using contemptuous language claimed that of the court rendered unjust decision on the case GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Ilustre claimed that the Court acted unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself from participating when in fact he is a law-partner of the defense counsel Atty Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the Court en banc reviewed the history of the case and found no reason to take action, stating that Justice Yap inhibited himself from the case and was only designated as Chairman of First Division on 14 July 1986 after the resolution of dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again addressed letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a warning of exposing the case to another forum of justice, to which she made true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on 16 Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself

Page 5 of 13 reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press. Tanodbayan dismissed petitioner’s Complaint Issue: Whether or not Laureta is guilty Ruling: Yes. Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law until further Orders. Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. The supremacy of the Supreme Court’s judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks and balances under a republican form of government such that the three co-equal branches of government are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other. 6. Leo echegaray vs sec of justice FACTS: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve. ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered… that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function. HELD: No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves,

Digests commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government. 7. Lualhati line vs amante purisima 8. Eugene tan, acejas, fernandez vs diosdado macapagal Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the Filipino people. Facts: The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating Constitutional Convention was "withoutpower, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss andadopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of agovernment other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being]merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the generalplan laid down therein." Issues: 1) WON the petitioners has locus standi 2)WON the court has jurisdiction over the case Held: 1. NO. Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have apersonal and substantial interest in the case such

Page 6 of 13 that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury asa result of its enforcement."Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works: validity of a statute may be contested only by one who willsustain a direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement. Taxpayers only have standing on laws providing for the disbursement of public funds.“Expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of istering anunconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be ened at the request ofa taxpayer." 2. NO. At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized any resolution that would radically alter the1935 constitution therefore not yet ripe for judicial review. The case becomes ripe when the Con-Con hasactually does something already. Then the court may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of the body.Separation of power departments should be left alone to do duties as they see fit. The Executive and theLegislature are not bound to ask for advice in carrying out their duties, judiciary may not interfere so that it mayfulfil its duties well. The court may not interfere until the proper time comes “ripeness 9. Telecomm and broadcast attorneys and gma vs commission on elections Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881. Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

Digests

“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.” Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to rs and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such. Issues: (1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws. (2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation.

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Held: Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them. The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC. 10. Kilosbayan vs manuel morato FACTS: [T]his suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in the first case [decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC)]. Petitioners maintain (1) that the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is a

Digests different lease contract with none of the vestiges of a t venture which were found in the Contract of Lease nullified in the prior case; (2) that the ELA did not have to be submitted to a public bidding because it fell within the exception provided in E.O. No. 301, §1 (e); (3) that the power to determine whether the ELA is advantageous to the government is vested in the Board of Directors of the PCSO; (4) that for lack of funds the PCSO cannot purchase its own on-line lottery equipment and has had to enter into a lease contract; (5) that what petitioners are actually seeking in this suit is to further their moral crusade and political agenda, using the Court as their forum. ISSUE: Whether or not the ELA between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. is invalid. HELD: NO. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction was dismissed. Pertinent to the issue, the SC held: xxx (3) that the ELA is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and is not contrary to the charter of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office; (4) that under §1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office has authority to enter into a contract for the holding of an on-line lottery, whether alone or in association, collaboration or t venture with another party, so long as it itselfholds or conducts such lottery; and (5) That the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) in question did not have to be submitted to public bidding as a condition for its validity. RATIO: E.O. No. 301, §1 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment. It does not refer to contracts of lease of equipment like the ELA. The provisions on lease are found in §§ 6 and 7 but they refer to the lease of privately-

Page 8 of 13 owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government-owned buildings or spaces for private use, and these provisions do not require public bidding. It is thus difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 can be applied to the ELA when the only feature of the ELA that may be thought of as close to a contract of purchase and sale is the option to buy given to the PCSO. An option to buy is not of course a contract of purchase and sale. Indeed the question is not whether compared with the former t venture agreement the present lease contract is “[more] advantageous to the government.” The question is whether under the circumstances, the ELA is the most advantageous contract that could be obtained compared with similar lease agreements which the PCSO could have made with other parties. Petitioners have not shown that more favorable could have been obtained by the PCSO or that at any rate the ELA, which the PCSO concluded with the PGMC, is disadvantageous to the government. 11. Ernesto francisco vs jose venecia FACTS: Pres. Estrada filed with the SecGen of the HOR, a verified impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and seven (7) other Associate Justices of the Court for violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and, committing high crimes. The House Committee on Justice dismissed said complaint for insufficiency of substance. The next day, Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella, the same complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., alleging underpayment of the COLA of the and personnel of the judiciary from the JDF and unlawful disbursement of said fund for various infrastructure projects and acquisition of service vehicles and other equipment. Attached to the second impeachment complaint was a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the of the House of Representatives. The complaint was set to be transmitted to the Senate for appropriate action. Subsequently, several petitions were filed

Digests to stop the illegal spending of public funds for the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice. Petitioners contended that the filing of second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice was barred under Article XI, Sec. 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution which states that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." Respondent HOR through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or en the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. ISSUE: Whether or not the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is valid under Article XI, Sec. 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: No. Petitioners, as taxpayers, had sufficient standing to file the petitions to prevent disbursement of public funds amounting to millions of pesos for an illegal act. The petitions were justiciable or ripe for adjudication because there was an actual controversy involving rights that are legally demandable. Whether the issues present a political question, the Supreme Court held that only questions that are truly political questions are beyond judicial review. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to resolve with definitiveness the issues of constitutionality. It is duty bound to take cognizance of the petitions to exercise the power of judicial review as the guardian of the Constitution. This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the

Page 9 of 13 land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to upon that problem head on. Â No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life. The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other. The second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. is BARRED. under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

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Digests 12. Phil assoc of colleges universities vs sec of education

and

Facts: The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that Acts No. 2706 otherwise known as the “Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction” and was amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers. Section 1 of Act No. 2706 “It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same,” The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education before opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. And in to the first proposition of the petitioners they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of

the said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court. Issue: Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no. 180 may be declared void and unconstitutional? Held: The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the of law and needs no relief in the form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented before the court. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of executive and legislative action he must show that he has sustained common interest to all of the public. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy between litigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that abuse by officials entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and

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Digests memoranda issued by the Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the petition for prohibition. 13. Prof randolf macapagal arroyo

david

vs

gloria

Facts: On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus: NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commanderin-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army, and some of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of

government as a clear and present danger. Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises – in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building – were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence. Issues: 1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid? 2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid? Ruling: [The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.] 1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid. [S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

Digests committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and x x x. Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective “Oust Gloria Now” and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally. Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. 2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid. [T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the

Page 12 of 13 person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives. 14. Francisco de agbayani vs pnb Facts: Plaintiff De Agbayani obtained the loan in the amount of P450.00 from def endant Bank in 1939. The said loan was secured by real estate mortgage duly regi stered covering property described in T.C.T. No. 11275 of the province of Pangas inan. Five years later, the loan matured but the bank PNB could not collect beca use of the war. A year later, President Osmena issued EO no. 32 (Debt Moratorium Law), which suspended the payment of loans for 4 years due to the ravages of th e war. In 1948, RA No. 342 extended the debt moratorium for another 8 years. How ever in 1953, the Supreme Court declared RA 342 as unconstitutional in the case of Rutter vs. Esteban. Fifteen years after the date of maturity of the loan, PNB instituted an extrajud icial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the balance. De Agbayani countered that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long been pr escribed since 15 years had already elapsed. He also sought and obtain a writ of Preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, PNB in its answer prayed for the dismissal o f the suit and alleged that if the period of debt moratorium were to be deducted from the computation then the right to foreclose the mortgage was still subsist ing. Issues: WON a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional shall have legal effects. Held: Yes. A statute though subsequently declared unconstitutional shall have legal ef fects. The orthodox view on an unconstitutional act is that it cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties nor can it justify any official act taken under it. However, the orthodox view may not be sufficiently realistic. It is an accepted doctrine that prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality the act is an oper ative fact to which legal consequences are attached. Prior to the declaration of

Digests unconstitutionality, the act must have been in force and complied with. It is entitled to obedience and respect until after the judi ciary, in an appropriate case, declares its unconstitutionality. It would be to deprive the law of fairness and justice if there be no recognition of what had t ranspired prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality.

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